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Abstract 
This thesis examines tbe ideal of authenticity: why we migbt want or need sucb an ideal, 
what such an ideal would look like, and what mechanisms we would need to ensure the 
success ful operation of such an ideal. 
Tbe tbesis bas tbree main parts. 
Th e fIrst part of the thesis aims at motivating the need to look to authenticity as a 
supplementary rdeal to normati,"" moraI theory. I do tbis by drawing a distinction 
between ethics and morality and arguing that there arc important aspects of our lives 
(such as our relations to ourselves) our beliefs and projects) about which normative 
moral theory fails to give us guidance and about wbich an ethical ideal, namely that of 
authenticity, can provide us with the requisite guidance. 
The second part of the thesis elucidates Nietzsche's vicw of authenticity as eternal return . 
I argue that eternal rerurn consists in holding a particular attirude to one's life - one's 
past, present and future. I then demonstrate that \vhat is fundamental to successfully 
li"ing authentically in accordance with eternal return is a rigorous search for self-
knowledge. 
In the third part of the thesis I argue that, in order to achieve the self-knowledge 
necessary to being a successful authentic agent, one must acquire it through a process of 
dialogue with oth er agents. I give a model of self-knowledge as a dialogic encounter that 
prm-ides two important mechanisms whereby such self-knowledge can be gained. 
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Introduction 
A large proportion of the contemporary work that has been done in ethics has fallen into 
three broad categories: meta-ethics (the study of the nature and status of moral claims) 
normative ethics (the generation of theories of morality), and applied ethics (the study of 
the practical applications and implications of moral theon} All three of these categories 
fall within what Bernard \X'illiams terms 'morality' (\\'illiams, 6ff) . Morality is a subset of 
a broader field of study, which \Xiilliams terms 'ethics' (\\"illiams, 6ff). E thics is a broad 
field that aims at answering the question CH ow ought I {Q live?', whilst morality is 
narrower, aiming to answer the question ,\X/hat ought I to do?'. 1 forality focuses 
specifically on action, and the generation of rules or principles according to which we 
ought to act. Ethics goes beyond this, to pro\'ide guidance about how we ought to live 
our liYes, encompassing such trungs as our relationships to ourselves, our relarions to Qur 
projects and what we believe. This thesis is an exercise in ethics in this sense. 
The thesis is di,~ded into three chapters. 
Chapter 1 has two main aims. The first is to motiva te the need for a focus on the ethical, 
and not merely on the m oral. In order to do this, I discuss the gap that I contend exists 
in tnodern normative theory, through a discussion of one of each of the three major 
rypes of normati,"e theon· (deontology, conseguentialism and virtue ethics). This gap 
arises due to normatiYe theon"'s exclusive focu s on th e moral. This leaves it unable to 
give us guidance on the ethical question of how we ought to live. It is important {O note, 
however, that I do not call upon normative theory to fill this gap from \\~thin. Instead I 
propose that we need an ethical ideal to supplement norma rive theory. This is because 
normative theory is set up to deal \"ith only those aspects of our conduct (har art' 
amenable to uni,"ersali,y. In the realm of the ethical, on the other hand, notions of 
partiality and particulariry are of great importance. I prO\"ide a framework for the type of 
ideal that would suit this purpose. Such an ideal must be able to give us guidance on the 
broader ethical question of how we ought to li\"e. In o th er words, such an ideal musr 
help us in our pursuit of the good life, 'the right life . . for human beings "' such' 
(\\"illiam s, 20), ra ther than simply providing us with rules or principles not to be violated. 
The second aim of this chapter is to establish authenticitv as the right candidate for such 
a supplementary ideal. I do this by examining another possible candidate ideal, that of 
sincerity. Through a critique of sincerity'S flaws, I set up the criteria that authenticity 
must meet to be a successful candidate ideal. I argue that authenticity is the correct ideal 
to pursue, and provide a working definition of it as being a state of the bringing to self. 
reflective coherence of one's beliefs and desires, through the holding of a creative 
attitude towards oneself. 
Chapter 2 aims to focalise the tentative definition of authenticity given at the end of 
chapter 1 through an examination of Friedrich Nietzsche's account of authenticity. I 
argue chat N ietzsche's project is not, as is claimed by some of his critics, the destruction 
of morality simpliti"': .-\s argued by Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche does not encourage 
immorality, or desire the avoidance of all moral actions (Clark, x,·ii). Nietzsche (albeit 
tacidy) draws the same type of distinction between ethics and morality that \X'ilIiams 
does. Given thac he draws this distinction, what he attacks is not morality itself, but 
ethical ideals masquerading as moral ones. In other words, he attacks ideals that claim 
universal applicabilin' when they in fact have no right to do so. One of his major targets 
is the ascetic ideal, which is exacdy such a masquerading ethical ideal. The ascetic ideal 
presupposes a metaphysic that places a strong emphasis on the otherworldly and 
advocates that one prioritises the otherworldly oyer this world. It advocates living one's 
life in poverty and humilin' and loving one's neighbour, and encourages people to view 
themseh'es as guilty and in need of redemption . . "ccording to the ideal, this way of living 
is appropriate and beneficial to all, and objecti"ely justified. According to Nietzsche, the 
ideal is in fact motivated by the priests' desire to maintain some feeling of power, and is 
in fact not necessarily beneficial to those who subscribe to it. Nietzsche claims that the 
reason for the ideal's continued flourishing is the absence of a suitable counter-ideal. I 
contend that Nietzsche in fact provides us with such a counter-ideal, in the form of his 
account of authenticity. According to Nietzsche, to be authentic is to be 'a kind of artist 
who freely shapes his self as a work of art' (Golomb, 69). I discuss Nietzsche's account 
of authenticity in terms of eternal return, arguing that it provides us ·with an alternative to 
the ascetic ideal as it offers us an alternath"e means of dealing with the reality of Our 
human condition through aiming to\\'ards self· knowledge and aYoiding self.deception. 
Chapter 3 provides a supplementation to a particular aspect of Nietzsche's account of 
authenticity - the role it accords (or fails to accord) to others in the acquisition of self· 
knowledge. In order to be the sort of authentic agent that N ietzsche describes, one 
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needs to haye self-knowledge. Nietzsche draws our attention to this on a number of 
occasions. but he does not place any real emphasis on the n1ethod(s) whereby we are 
supposed to gain sel f-knowledge. I argue that self-knowledge is a dialogic process, which 
must, if it is to be successful, accord a significant role and value to others. In order to do 
this I draw on and expand upon David Jopling's account of dialogic self-knowledge and 
self-knowledge acquisition. Jopling claims that self-knowledge and 11, acquisition require 
a particular type of dialogue. I provide a theoretical framework for the operation of such 
dialogue, by drawing on Robert Brandom's account of assertion . I then discuss the 
relationship that must exist between the participants in such a dialogue, by drawing on 
Levinas' critique of 1\Ierleau-Ponty's account of intersubjccth·ity. 
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Chapter 1 
Normative theory and supplementary ideals 
In this chapter 1 contend that there exists a gap in traditional normative approaches to 
ethics, and that, in order (0 fill this gap, we must turn to o ther values or ideals that are 
not counten anced by such theories. In section 1, I explain what I believe the gap in 
modern normau\'c theory to be and explain \-vhy I belie\+c this gap arises. In addressing 
these issues, I provide a framework for the t"pc of theory that might be u,eful in 
attempting to fill the gap. In section 2, I discuss one such theory, that of the ideal of 
sincerity. Section 3 comprises a critique of this ideal, which in turn pro\'ides a 
framework for what a more comprehensive ideal might look like. Finally, in section 4, I 
provide guidelines for a theory of authentici ty that does not fall prey to the same 
critigues as sinceri ty . • -\ t this point, the definition of authenticity is to be merely a sketch, 
which will be fillcd out in greater detail as the thesis progresses. 
1, Minding the gap 
The gap thar I contend exists in norma th'c theory arises both from a particular 
conception of which aspects of our liycs normative ethical theories arc applicable to and 
from a particular conception of the role of normatiYe ethical theories in guiding our 
actions. In order to demonstrate this, I discuss the distinction drawn between morality 
and ethics, as laid out by Williams and Foucault. I then elucidate Nozick's conception of 
nlorali t~· as side-constraints and explain ho\v traditional normative ethical theories fall 
under this conception . From this, I draw out two problems that arise for normative 
ethics, so as to motivate the need for an additional ideal as supplementary to them. 
Before commencing with my arguments in this section, J would like to examine and 
dismiss one of the major types of objection tha, is generall,' Je,'elled at this type of 
criticism of normati\'e ethics. I will term this the 'so what?' objection. It runs as follows. 
Most (if not all) theorists of normative ethics would concede that there do exist gaps in 
normati,'e ethical theon'. One such gap might be the one mentioned abm'e - that these 
theories are not applicable to a broad cross-section of Qur acti\-ities and that their 
principles only provide tninimal guidance. Howe\'er, they would also hold that the onus 
does not rest on normative ethics to fill these gaps. Thus we may be prompted to ask 
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'So what if there are gaps' The filling of these gaps falls outside the scope of normatiYe 
theory's project.' I am happy to concede this, as the objection presented in fact has no 
effect on the case that I layout in the rest of this section. This is because my argument 
does not call upon normative ethics to fill the gaps from the inside. In fact, it is explicitly 
an attempt to fill these gaps from outside the boundaries of normative ethical theories as 
they are traditionally construed, by appealing to other nlues and ideals that do nOt form 
parr of the sets of principles advocated by these theories. 1 
Bernard \\"'illiams draws a distinction between morality on the onc hand and ethics on 
the other (\\"illiams, 6ff). Ethics, for Williams, is a broad field of stud,', encompassing 
many aspects of the ways in which we should lead our lives. .\ccording to Williams, 
n10rality is one part of ethics, which encompasses only particular aspects of how we 
should lead our !i\'es, focusing specifically on action::!. ~forality is ethics narrowl\-
construed and is specifically concerned \vith cerrain notions, such as duty and right. \Ye 
might look at the distinction in terms of the questions that morality and ethics attempt to 
answer. Ethics is concerned with answering the broad question 'How ought I to live?' 
while morality is concerned with proyiding an answer to the more specific question 
,\X'hat ought I to do?'. This is not to say that ethics does not answer questions about 
what one ought to do (as this is surely part of how one lives), but to say that in addition 
to this ethics pro\~ides answers to other questions (e.g. '\\'hat ought I to believe?', '\X'hat 
ought my relation to myself be?', 'What ought my relation be to my projects?,) that fall 
beyond the scope of morality. Thus the realm of the moral is a subset of the realm of 
the ethical. .\s such, all lnoral actions are necessarily ethical actions, but SOlne ethical 
actions fall outside the sphere of morality. For example, my decision to consistently read 
/ Jst,rix instead of .\ristorle hardh' seems to be immoral, but it might be construed as 
unethical if viewed in the light of my failing to be true to my project of becoming a 
philosopher. 
:\nother way of \'iewing the distinction between ethics and morality is that provided by 
Michel Foucault. .\ccording to Foucault, ethics is concerned with 'the way in which the 
1 Tht: idt:a thar tht: gaps in normaon: rht:ory art: nor normative theory's to fill will beco me clearer wht:!n I 
discuss the notion of unjn~rsality below. 
::! \,'illiams specifically nott:!s thar moraliry generally applies to thosc aspccts of our !i\'CS which u1\"olyc 
()tht:r-reg-anling actions (\'\'illiams, 6), although it is nor immediarely clear that the realm of the moral rnig-hr 
not e:xteOll to self-re:garding actions a:; \\ ell. .-\ Kantian, for example:, would \;e: \\" ~uch (~e:emingly) self-
re:garding actions as lying to oneself or suicide as dear-cur examples of immoral actions. 
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individual has to conSUtute himself as the prime material of his moral conduct' 
(Foucault, 26). In other words, ethics is concerned with self-formation, which does not 
necessarily have [0 be a rule-based activity. .i\!orality, on the other hand, is 'a set of 
values and rtf/a of adioll that are recommended to indh-iduals through the intermediary of 
various prescriptive agencies"" (Foucault, 25, Iny emphasis). Thus, wh at moral theory 
provides for us is a set of rules to which we are supposed adhere in the performance of 
actions. Once again, the conception is of the realm of the ethical as broader than that of 
the moral, since the work that must be done by an agent in constituting himself as Illora] 
encompasses more than just performing the corrccr actions in accordance \.\.'ith a sCt of 
rules or principles. \'(:hat is particularly important about Foucault's characterisation of 
the distinction between the moral and the ethical is the emphasis that he places on the 
notion of the agent de,·eloping himself. It is to this notion that we will return when 
examining possible supplements to normative theories in sections 2 and 4 of this chapter. 
Foucault's conception of morality as providing a set of rules for action is similar to 
Robert Nozick's conception of morality. It is to this conception that I now turn. 
According to Nozick, morality provides us with a set of 'side-constraints' (Nozick, 29). 
\,\ 'hat he means b~· this is that moral theories provide us with the boundaries of action in 
the form of a set of rules or principles. In pursuing our goals, we are limited by the 
injunction not to overstep these boundaries, i.e. nOt to ,-iolate the rules. Provided that 
we do not overstep the boundaries, our actions are morally permissible. On thi ~ yie\\", 
there is no need for further consideration of anything else that goes on in between the 
boundaries, as the rules come into play only as a litnit on which actions may be 
performed. This ,-iew of the role and applicability of moral theory is one that is 
applicable to modern normative ethical theories. 
There are three general classes of theories that constitute modern normative ethics: 
deontolog\" (e.g. Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism), consequentialism (e.g. utilitarianism) 
and virtue ethics (both ancient and modern). It is not m\" aim here to provide detailed 
accounts of each of these classes of theory. I aim only to provide (through the 
discussion of a theon· of each type) an account of the general form of each class and 
what concerns may arise from thi s form. The flrst two groups of theor\" (deontological 
\ By 'p rc::; cripun: a~c:ncic: :; ' Foucault ha:; in mind :;uch imtinluom a:; the farnil:·, t:uucauonal imotuuon:; and 
tht: church. \,'e mighr abo include in rhi:; group rht: corpu!'i of moral philo!'iophy, and normatin· rht:orit:!'i 
:;pt:cificaUy. 
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and consequentialist) share a number of similarities in form that they do not share with 
,"irrue ethics. I will thus begin with a discussion of examples of such theories 
(Kanrianism and utilitarianism) and then mm"e on to a discussion of virtue ethics. 
\Vhat both deontological and consequentialist theories of morality provide us with is a 
set of principles or rules which are supposed to delineate the limits of morally 
permissible action. These rules are designed to be general, universally applicable and 
agent-neutral. In other words, they are designed to be the sort of principles to which any 
rational agent should adhere in the performance of action. In the case of Kannan ethics, 
we are bound, through rationality, by the categorical imperative. \X.'e must act in such a 
way that we act only on those maxims that we could will to be universal4 . In the case of 
utilitarianism, we are told to perform actions that will maximise overall utility. Utility 
itself may be construed in a number of different ways, depending on the specific form of 
utilitarianism in question, but the general principle (that utility ought to be maximised) 
remains the same. Provided that we act in such a way that we do not violate the relevant 
rule or principle, each of these theories would judge our action to be a morally 
permissible one. 
Both deontological and consequentialist theories pro\-ide us with generally applicable, 
agent-neutral side-constraints. This feature of these theories gives rise to a concern. It 
may be argued that \.ve want more from ethics than just a set of rules that \.ve must m"oid 
yiolating. If all there is to being moral is acting in accordance with a set of principles, 
then anyone qualifies as a moral agent by not violating these principles_ There is no 
concern for who it is who performs the action, or what type of character that agent has. 
The concern is that, if this is all there is to ethics, then we will be unable to provide 
answers to the broader question of 'How ought I to liye?'. This is because, in order to 
answer this question, it seems that we need to have something to say about the agent 
performing the actions. In other words, we need to look at notions such as character 
and self-knowledge. Returning to the Nozickian point, these theories have nothing to 
say about what is going on inside the boundaries, and, in the realm of ethics, it is 
precisely this that we haye to say something about. 
4 Kant in fact h>1n~s four formulations of thc catt:gorical impcrativc in the GrolmdllJ()rJ. jor tbr 1l1etapl!)'jia of 
Morals, but this is the most commonly used of the formulations and suffIcient to demonstrate the point at 
hanJ. 
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.-\nother way of expressing this concern is with respect to the concept of universality. 
This is a concept that is held dear by normative theories, since such theories aim [Q 
provide us with moral rules or principles that will apply uni,~ersally to all rational persons. 
If we analyse the concept of universality, we may cash it out in terms of impersonality 
and impartiality>. A universal moral rule or principle is one which is agent-neutral 
(impersonal) and which aims at eliminating bias in our moral reasoning (impartial). 
Normati,"e theory takes its subject lnatter to be precisely that which falls ,\<;thin th e scope 
of universalin·. In ethics, however, partiality and particularity are very important. If we 
take Foucault's conception of the ethical seriously, it becomes cleal: that, in answering 
ethical questions, we are answering questions about the self-development of particular 
agents, who arc individuated from other agents in terms of their specific projects and 
situations . . -\s \X'illiams puts i t, the question of 'How ought I to li,'e' is 'a question about 
raj particular person' (Williams, 20) . \\'hilst the form of the guidelines for this 
development may be universal, the content is not. In contrast to this, normative theory 
provides us with both universal form (that moral deliberation takes) and universal 
content (the particular rules or principles advocated by a specific normati,'e theory). 
It is at this point that virtue ethics appears to be a more promising option('. Virtue ethics 
seems to escape the above concern for the very reason that its focus is on the character 
and character development of the agent. In traditional Aristotelian virtue ethics, for 
example, we are proyided not with a set of rules goyerning actions, but with a list o f 
"iIrues (such as honour and courage) that we ought to cultivate as part of our character 
and a list of vices (such as akraJia) that we ought to avoid. The character of the agent 
performing an action, and the way in which that agent develops that character, beconle~ 
directly important. Thus ,"irtue ethics escapes the concern raised above by placing 
emphasis on the agent and attempting to guide us in what kinds of people we ought to 
try to be. 
There is, however, a second concern that arises, to which all three classes o f theory fall 
pre\". This concern is that the lists of rules or of \·irtues and yices fail to capture 
numerous aspects of our dealings with the world. In the case of deontology and 
consequentialism, we do not simply want guidance about what it is that we ought to do, 
~ .-\n elucidating conversation with ;\larius \~eImaak was of great hdp in formulating this position. 
(, ;\ly thanks to Dr Samanlha \ "iet! for many helpful cum'el:satlons o n the subjecr of "irrue ethics. 
·This is discussed in gn:ar detail in .Yi."!JI."Ja:iJrall Et/t.irs. 
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we also want guidance about how it is that we ought to ll,·e. It \\oill not be sufficient here 
to claim that ac t utilitarianism requires us to apply utilitarian calculations to all Our 
acuons. Firstly (as can be seen by the move away from act utilitarianism to rule 
utilitarianism) this ,-iew of how we should go about acting is a deeply crippling one, both 
theoreticall,- and practicall,-. Secondly, it rna,' be argued that there is more to the good 
life than maximising utility . . -\.5 \X'illiams pertinently observes: '\\"e do not merely want 
the world to contain certain states of affairs [e.g. those of maximal utility] (it is a deep 
error of conseguentialism to believe that this is all we want)' (\,'illiams, 56). Yirtue 
ethics does go further towards satisfying the demand for guidance about how we ought 
to liYe, by placing the emphasis on character and character dcyclopment, but it still does 
not escape the concern at hand. The list o f virtues and yices it provides us with, even if 
correct, is not an exhausti"c one'\ and so aspects of daily life fall outsidc o f its scope. It 
seems that simply following the rules or cultivating a specific kind o f character is not 
going to be sufficient for leading the good life. "-\ccording to Williams, the ethical 
guestion 'seems to ask for the conditions of tbe good life - the right life perhaps, for 
human beings as such ' (\X!illiams, 20). 
It is beyond the scope of this section to provide a fme-grained discussion of the detai ls 
of what constirutes the good life. The conception of the good life that I have in mind 
here is largely a formal one. \);lhat constitutes a good life is a life that is fulfilled and 
fulfIlling for Ib, agmt tbat I,ad,. it. .-\s John Cottingham has pertinently pointed out, in 
order for us to live ful filled and fulfLlling lives, we must 'try to understand ourselves and 
.. [attempt] to remon the obstacles to fulfilled and happ,- living' (Cottingham, 5). If we 
are to live the good life, what we need is an effort towards self·knowledge. This self-
knowledge is then to be used in the service of being fulfilled. This will occur through the 
bringing to self-reflexiye coherence of an agent's beliefs and desires or, in Cottingham's 
terms, the agent's reason and their passions. This pro,·ides us with a blueprint for the 
sort of broad ethical ideal that we can use to supplemen t the gap in fl10dern normatiYe 
theory. Such an ideal must place importance on self.knowledge and coherence of self. It 
is to an ideal of this (ype, that of sincerity, that I turn in the following section. 
" I am not making allY claim ht:[t! abour w hether or nor propo nel1f!' of \,irrul:: ethic:; purport tht: lisr of 
\'Ifrut:!' and \'ict:s to be: txhausti\'t: . 
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2, The ideal of sincerity 
Sincerin' is an ideal which places emphasis on self-kn owledge, albeit in a somewhat 
indirect luanner. Our commonsense notion of sin cerity is that to be sincere is to present 
oneself faithfully to others. In order to make a faithful presentation of oneself to others, 
it seems clear that one must know the self that one is presenting. In this section T discuss 
Lionel Trilling's account of sincerity in his book Simmi)' alld AIII/;enliciry, In the next 
section I offer a critique of this ideal, so as to sel up a framework for the examination of 
an alternati\~e ideal, that of authenticity. 
Trilling begins his discussion of the notions of sincerin' and authenticity by obselYing 
that we may, on occasion, 'observe the moraf' life in the process of revising itself' 
(Trilling, I), On one level this is a comment about moral history, The Reformation, for 
example, may be ,'ie\\,ed as an instance of the moral life (and the prevailing ethos) 
rC"ising itself. i\fore importantly, however, this is a comment about the nature of the 
self. It tacith' draws our attention to the theory of the self that is implicit in Trilling's 
account, If the moral life is capable of revision, then the self (as the initiator and 
maintainer of that life) is capable of development and change, Thus, in this account, the 
self is not etemall,' fixed and immutable. Trilling holds that there are nvo ways in which 
such a re"ision In,,' be made. The flIst is by 'reducing the emphasis [the moral life] 
formerly placed upon one or another of its elements' (Trilling, 1). The second is bl' 
'inventing and adding to itself a new element, some mode of conduct or of feeling which 
hitherto it had not regarded as essential to virtue, I" (Trilling, I), In other words, the 
moral life ma,' re,'ise itself by eirher subtraction or addition, which ma\' (and probabh' 
quite often will) be instanriated in a change of emphasis, The idea of re"isions of the 
moral life (in both their additive and subtracti\'e aspects) is one that sits well with the 
theorists of authenticity to be examined later. For example, Nietzsche urges that we 
decrease the emphasis that we formerly placed on 'traditional' or received morality In 
favour of an increased effort to cultivate self-creaciyity and authentic will to powerl). 
'I Trillinl!; usc::; [he: word 'morality' to denote: both what I have ddim:d a:-; morality and whar ] han: defmed 
as ethlc~ . 
I" This is what Trilling bdievC!s to be the case wid) sincel"jt~ .. , as will be: discusstd in )..\"teater dt!taii bdO\v. 
11 Nierzsche\ account ()f aurhenticity is the subjt!cr of Chapter :2 of this thesis. 
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_-\5 far as Trilling is concerned, sincerity is a <state or quality of the self and refers mainly 
to 'a congruence between ayowal and actual feeling' (Trilling, 2). He discusses the 
operation of this congruence with reference to Polonius' injunction to Laertes in 
Shakespeare's Hamlet. 'to thine own self be true! And it doth follow, as the night the 
day/ Thou canst not then be false to any man' (Hamlet, ll , ii, 77-79). In this statement, 
Polonius both conceives of sincerity as an essential condition of yurue CThou canst nOt 
then be false to anI" man') and shows how it can be achieved (,to thine own self be true'). 
Thus, in order to be sincere, an agent must have a relation of truthfulness to himself. It 
is this requirement for having a parti cular relation to oneself that makes sincerity an 
ethical ideal - its requirements go beyond rules for action . 
This is not, of course, to say that such a relation is easily attained or easily attainable. 
Trilling is explicit on the fact that sincerity is something that cannot be attained (without 
the most arduous effort' (Trilling, 6). However, the making of this efforr was, at a 
certain point in moral history, concei\"ed of as being of great importance to the leading of 
a moral life. 
Trilling utilises a genealogical examination of the etymology of the word 'sincerity' in 
order to demonstrate how its application deYeloped, how sincerity gained importance as 
an ethical ideal and finally how its influence waned. The word derh"es from the Latin 
sil/arm, meaning 'clean, sound or pure' (Trilling, 12). It entered the English language 
somewhere around the sixteenth century and in its earliest usage referred to things Cboth 
material and immaterial') rather than to human subjects (Trilling, 12). For example, one 
migh t haye spoken of wine or \vater as being sincere, in tbe sense of unadulterated. Its 
use \\~th respect to persons remained 'largely metaphorical' (frilling, 13). A. person could 
be said to be sincere, to have a sincere life, in the sense that their life was <sound, or pure, 
or whole, or consistent in its virtuousness' (Trilling, 13). In other words, the word 
'sincere' in this usage in fact applied more to the person's life (as a sort of an object) than 
it did to the person himself. The use of the word 'sincere' as applied to persons 
deYeloped to mean 'the absence of dissimulation, or feigning, or pretence' (hilling, 13). 
It is this sense of sincerity that Polonius has in mind when advising Laertes, and it is this 
sense of the word that is the one that most readily springs to mind in an ethical context. 
In Polonius' formulation of sincerin·, it follows necessarill· ('as the night [follows] the 
da,·') from being [rue to oneself that one cannot be false with others (i.e. that one will be 
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drtuous) \2. Given that sincerity is thus conceived of as essential to ,-irrue, a normative 
claim is generated. One ought not to be false to others, and in order to do this, one 
ought to be true to one's self, in the sense of crearing a congruence between what one 
believes, thinks, feels (in short, one's mental states) and one's a,·owals thereof. Thus 
sincerity becomes an ethical ideaL 
:\ nother way of examining the ethical force of the ideal of sinceri ty is to examine what a 
failure of sincerity would amount to. If one fails to be sincere, onc is false with others, 
by virtue of not avowing one's mental states truthfully to them. In other words, one 
hides one's true motivations and beliefs from others. ]t is interesting to note at this point 
that many of the classic villains of literature arc characters who fail to be sincere !" , 
.According to Trilling, 'a villain is a dissembler, his e\·il nature apparent to the audience 
lor reader], but concealed from those with whom he treads the boards [or pages], 
(frilling, 15). If we shift this definition out of a literary context, it still seems to hold 
that, in a society in which sincerity is the ethical ideal, the villain, in other words, the 
unethical member of that society, is a subject who conceals his true motivations and 
beliefs from others, thereby deceiving them. It is important to note that, in order to 
purposefully conceal their true motivations and beliefs from others, an insincere person 
must in fact know or be aware of what those motivations and beliefs are, The benefits to 
the villain of deceiving others may be many and varied, but would tll'ically include 
facilitation of his projects without the hindrance of having to be honest to others and 
operate above board. 
:'.ccording to Trilling, what interests us mOte (in our current context) than the deception 
practiced by the self on others is the deception practiced by the self on itself (frilling, 
16). There are a numb"" of reasons for this. This is parth- due to a shift in emphasis in 
literan-, political and philosophical theor\' . There has been a modern shift In emphasis 
from the moral agent as an obeyer of externally imposed rules to the moral agent as in 
some way having a role in the construction of the moral landscape. For example, in 
Kantian ethics, there is an overarching moral principle (the Categorical Imperative) 
according to which one should act, but it is through the exercise of one's own reason 
that one C01nes to recognise it as such . This places emphasis on the agent as 
C It is ljut.:soonablt whether this in fact holds . Howt:n:r, I will san m~- critiljut: untill g-ivt: the critiljUt: of 
sincerity in gent:ral, so as to foUow tht: thread of Trilling's aq.,'llmenr at this poim. 
1.\ For t::xamplt: lago in Shakespeare's Olbrlio and Tarrufft: in )'lo!it:re's T(1r/I(he. 
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autonomous, and responsible to himself in the exercise of that autonomy. In Protestant 
ethics emphasis is placed upon the indiyidual's own unique relation to God, for and to 
\vhich that indiyidual is responsible. 
On a more basic philosophical level our interest in self-deception is due to the difficulties 
\.ve experience in accounting for this phenomenon as compared to the relative ease with 
'\vhich we are capable of accounting for the deception of others. In cases of other-
deception, the decei,~er knows or truly belieyes that p. but ayows to the deceived that 
not-p, in order to induce in ,he deceived the belief that not-po In cases of self-deception, 
however, there is no duality of the deceiver and the deceived. Thus, the subject must 
somehow have both p and not-p in their consciousness simultaneouslv (Mele, 121)1'. 
The notion of self-deception becomes important in this context, given that, if one is to 
be sincere, one must be tIue to oneself in order to be true to o thers. Being u·ue to 
oneself requires self-knowledge and the avoidance of obscuring or fabricating aspects of 
that self, which in turn is supposed to lead to one's being true to others. In other words, 
sincerity should in\,oh'e an avoidance of self-deception. In addition (as we shall see in 
Chapter 2) one of the ways of dealing \\l1th authenticity is to \'ie\v authenticin' as 
fundamentally inyoh'ing the avoidance of self-deception. 
3. A critique of sincerity 
Having risen as an ethical ideal, reaching its height in the eighteenth century,l5 the 
influence of sincerity over our ethical lives began to wane. There are four major reasons 
for the decline of sincerity as an ethical ideal. J will discuss each of these reasons in turn, 
in order to delTIOnstrate how they problematise the ideal of sincerity and give us reason 
to seek an alternative ideal. 
The first major reason for sincerity's decline as an ethical ideal is that sincerity, according 
to Trilling, integrally inyolves 'the reason that Polonius gives for being true to one's own 
self: that if one is, one cannot then be false to an\' man' (Trilling, 9). \'Cithin this first 
problem for sincerity, we can discern two aspects, The first is that the reason given by 
I~ For a mort: dt:tailc:d di:;cu:;:;ion ofthi:; :;ee ;\Idc:\ chaptt:r 'Sdf-dt:ct:poon: Tht: Paradox of Bdit:f in hi:; 
117't1iiolla/i(y: All fSSq)' 011 Akrtlsia, Se!i:duej'tioll alld Seij:,Ymtro/ (( hford: ( )L'P, 1987). 
I ; Evidt:nce of thi:; j:; tht:: ri:;~ of the ~enre of confe:;:;ional autobiography during thi:; era a:; a form of 
"irtuousnt:::;:;, Tht: publication of Rou:;:;eau\ Con/essiollJ' (1764-1'75), a work ru:;cu:;:;ed in some detail by 
Trilling, i:; a ca:;e in point. 
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Poloniu, assumes that it necessarily follows ('a, the night [follows] the day,) from being 
true to oneself that onc is unable ('canst not') to be false to others. This does not seem 
to follow necessarily. It is plausible that the self to which I am true is one that prioritises 
the deception of others, for example. Even if \.ve were to grant that it did follow, 
however, the reason would still run into a second problem. The only motiyation for 
being true to ourseh'es with which the reason provides us is that doing so will prevent us 
from being false to others . The reason's influence oyer us has declined 'not because the 
moral temper of our time sets no store by the avoidance of falsehood to others' but 
because 'it does not propose being tfue to oneself as an end but only as a means' 
(Trilling, 9). This is problematic since it fails to accord anything but instrumental value 
to being true to oneself. This in turn makes it difficult to prioritise being true to oneself 
over other (potentially as effective) means to being virtuous, such as following a 
particular set o f principles or cultivating certain character traits . 
The second major reason for the decline of sincerity as an ethical ideal is that it assumes 
that the self is in some sense given or clictated and fixed by one's position in society. 
This mar seem like a strange assumption to have as part of an ethical ideal, but given the 
context of the ideal of sincerity's introduction it is nOt particularly surprising. ~lodern 
liberal-democratic ideals formed no part of the ethical or political landscap e of the 
sixteenth century. \,'illiams goes as far as to remark that it has been in every society a 
recognisable ethical thought . .. that one can be under [an ethical] requirement ... simph' 
because of who one i, and of one's social si tuation' (\'('illiams, 7). Trilling adds to his 
definition of a \"illain In a literary context discussed above that such a person is 
'characteristically [one] who seeks to rise above the station to which he was born' 
(Trilling, 16) . Taking this out of a literary context, it becomes clear that there i, an 
assumption that either one's inner being is determined by one's social station or that 
one's social station is determined by one's inner being. This is eyidenced by the fact that, 
in a society that holds sincerity a< it, highest ethical ideal, the villain is, as discussed 
above, a dissembler an d, in addition, one who tries to rise above his appointed social 
stauon. Sincerity is firmly embedded in and serves to confirm or reinforce social 
cu:cumstances. In other words, \\-'ithin the ideal o f sincerity is implicit the assumption 
that there is a definite and externally fixed self to which one is supposed to be true so a, 
to present that self faithfully to others. This introduces a political element to sincerity, 
since, unlike in the discussion thus far, it does not merely deal with one to one 
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intersubjecti\'iry, but with the indiyidual's relation to society. It also raises the guestion 
of what the relation between an ethical ideal and notions such as one's place in society 
should be. W'e ought to be ablc to take a critical stance with respect to society and its 
nlues, which is not an opportunity afforded to us by the ideal of sinceri ty. It is this lack 
of critical scope with respect to society and societally defined values because of this that 
problcmatises sinceri ty. 
The third of the reasons for the decline of sincerity as an ethical ideal arises due to the 
fact that, in order to be sincere, one must know what one's true beliefs and mou\'ations 
are, so as to present them faithfully to others. This assumes both that consciousness is 
completely transparent to itself and that it is possible for there to be an inunediate 
presentation of the self to o thers. These assumptions are denied by developments in 
psychological and political theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centunes. 
P sychoanalysis denies consciousness' complete transparen cy to itself. It posits certain 
aspects of a subject's mental life as opaque to them, possessed of meaning 'that may not 
be comcioush' felt b,' the person whose [mental] states ther are ' (Lopsron, 167). 
Another way of yiewing this lack of transparency is \·ia the Freudian notion of th e 
tripartite consciousness. According to Freud, the mind has three aspects: id, ego and 
superego. The id is the locus of subconscious instincts and drives, which are not present 
to the conscious ego. Once again, we have a picture of consciousness in which there is 
no assumption that it is transparent to itself. E \'en if there were a fixed self, we would, 
on this account, not have any guarantee of unhindered access to it, as sincerity would 
demand. The demand that sincerity makes on us is thus an impossible one. Marxism 
denies that it is possible to have an immediate or unmedia ted presen ta tion of the self to 
o thers, especially once we move outside of the realm of one to one intersubjectivity and 
into that of the indi\'idual's relation to society. This is due to the pen'asivc influence of 
fal se consciousness, which distorts the individual's self-conception and thus their 
interactions with others. ;\.gain, the demand of sincerity is an impossible one. Even if 
there were a fixed self, we would still not be able to give an immediate presentation of it 
to others. The necessary conditions of sincerity are that one has unhindered access to 
one's true beliefs and motivations and that one can present these to others in an 
un mediated fashion . If these conditions cannot be fulfilled, then the ideal can never be 
fully realisable. It could be sugge"ed that we should view sincerity as a regulative ideal -
something towards which wc should strive eyen in the knowledge that it will never be 
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fully realised. Howcyer, giyen the pervash-ene:;:; of the fearure:; about ourseh"es that 
mitigate against the fulftlment of the conclition:; for sincerity, we have good reason to 
look for an alrernatiye ideal that, even if it is not itself completely realisable, goes further 
towards. ayoiding Inaking assumptions about the self and our access to it that ha\-e been 
argued to be false. 
The fourth reason for sincerity's decline is the changing way in which we yie\ved our 
selves. The introduction of sincerity as an ethical ideal, and the shift in emphasis that 
accompanied this introduction, constitute an additiye revision of the ethical life. 
I-:lowcver, once the ideal was in place, it operated on the assumption of a fixed self, 
denying the notion of a constantl,· changing and de\-eloping self that allowed its 
introduction in the first place. 1\fany of the writers discussing the notion of sinceri\lY' 
seem (Q assume that there is in fact some fixed core which is one's own self to which one 
can be true and that it is by an accurate representation of this self to others that one is 
\-irtuous. Part of the decline of the ideal of sinceIitl, is the renewed demand (both in 
theory and practice) that we again recognise that the self is not a fixed thing or object, 
but constantly in flux, developing and changing . 
• -\n example of a critique of sincerity along rhese lines is that of Jean-Paul Sartre. He 
criticises the ontology of self assumed b~' the ideal of sinceri\l·. Nietzsche (as we \vill see 
in Chapter 2) runs a similar critique against the ascetic ideal, albeit using di fferent 
terminology. In his chapter on bad faith in Beil1,g afld 1',!othillgness, Sartre discusses sincerity 
as a form of bad faith!'. According to Sartre, bad faith im-olves a misconstrual or 
misreprcsentauon of the human condition. The human condition consists of both 
transcendence and facticity. Transcendence is the aspect of human reality that is 
consuwted by freedom. Facricity is constituted by factors such as race, sex, class, social 
situation and standing, history etc. In other words, our facticity consists of all the things 
that are true of us, but which, \vhen taken altogether, do not provide a complete 
definition of us in the way that a complete list of the properties of an object would do. 
\'·hen one is in bad faith, one o\-eremphasises one's transcendence, or overemphasises 
one's facticity, or mistakes the one for the other. 
lI'For t:xample, Rousseau, :'Iatrhew ;.I.,.rnold, Shahspt:art:. 
1 ~ For (I more dt:tailed discussion of tht: notion of bad faith and of sinct:rity as bad faith, Set' B, ;J/,g miff 
.· .. ·,;olhillgllI'J.'·, Parr I, Chaptt:r:2 (,Bad Faith'). 
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Sartre begins his discussion of sincerity as bad faith by stating that sincerity is generally 
,'iewed as the antithesis of bad faith (Sartre, 98). ."ccording to Sartre, the ideal of 
sincerity is tha t 'man is for bimself nothing more than he is (Sartre, 98, my translation) . 
This is precisely the sort of definition of sincerity that Polonius has in mind when he 
ad"ises Laertes. Sartre then alerts us to the fact that this is precisely the definition of the 
in-itself, 1.e. of an object whIch is completely definable by its present properties. If I 
make an effort at sincerity, 'it is necessary for me, when I examine myself, to determine 
exactly what I am', 'to constitute myself like an object' (Sartre, 102, my translation). In 
being sincere I 'posit a causal determinism which constitutes the flux of my states of 
consciousness like a series of physical states' (Sartre, 103, my translation). This 
constitutes bad fai th since it is a misconstrual of the reality of the human condition. In 
making an effon to be sincere, I fix my identity in the same way that the identi ry of an 
object is fixed . I make myself into the sum of my factical properties. By doing this I 
o veremphasise my facticity at the expense of my transcendence. Thus sincerity is bad 
faith in that it operates with an inaccurate ontology of self. 
In addition to this, bad faith is not, according to Sartre, merely a matter of error. In bad 
faith, one 'masks a displeasing truth) or presents as truth a pleasing untruth' (Sartre, 87, 
my translation) . Bad faith 'appears to have the same structure as a lie', but what makes 
the difference is that in bad faith 'it is from myself that I hide the truth' (Sartre, 87, ml' 
translation) . Thus, bad faith is a lie that takes place within a single unified consciousness. 
In other words, bad faith is essentially self-deception. Since sinceri ry is bad faith, it is 
self-deception. Thus the ideal of sincerity falls into the ,'erl' problem that it urges us to 
a"oid. In other words, the demand placed upon us by the ideal of sincerity (to be true to 
a fixed self so as to be true to others) is a self-defeating one. 
In combination, these reasons for the decline of the influence of the ideal of sincerity 
demonstrate why it is insufficient as an ethical ideal in Qllr current circumstances. 
Sincerity as an ideal is unreflective (in the sense of reflection as cri tical exanlination), 
merely reflecti,~e (in the sense of reflection as a mimesis of a gh-en circumstance), 
uncritical and lacking in scope for interpretation. It also seems that the major thrust of 
sincerity is the omission of obfuscation in one's dealings with others. Being true to 
oneself is merely a means to this end. 
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\\""e can construe sincerity in two ways" Either sincerity posits a conglomerate of the self 
and its values or it posits the self and then values that are separate from, but still 
connected to, the self. In the former case, both the self and the values are societally 
defined (as argued in section 2. above), and being sincere amounts to merely giying an 
accurate reflection of them to others. In the latter case, it seems that, al though the values 
will be externally imposed, if these ,"alues contradict the sel f, then the," may be rejected. 
W'hat must be tru thfully represented here is some essential own self. Both conceptions 
of sinceri ty are, ho\\,eyer, inadequate. The first is inadelJuate because it asks of us to 
subscribe to an ideal that would render our lives unli\"able in our context. It does this 
because it fails to be critical of society and the values it asks us to accept. Thus the fIrst 
formulation of sincerity provides no scope for criticism. \X·'hilst the second formulati on 
seems more appealing, since it provides some scope for criticism of society'S values, it is 
still inadequate because it does not make any allowance for a critical examination or 
questioning of the self that must accept or reject those ,""lues. 
Given the above critique of the ideal of sinceri ty, we can see that this ideal is problematic 
in two ways. Firstly, on the level of self, it is problematic because it assumes an ontology 
of a fLxed self to which we no longer adhere and to which we no longer ha\"e good 
reason to adhere. In order to illustrate why we lack good reason to adhere to an 
on tology of a fIxed self, I will briefly outline what an ontology of a non-fIxed self would 
look like. Since my aim here is not a metaphysical one, this account draws on and takes 
seriously our phenomenological experience of ourseh"es . \\o'e experience ourseh"es as 
being free, future-directed creatures. \\ 'e ha\·e certain projects, the project to complete a 
thesis, for example, rhat aim at ful ftlment at some time in the fu ture. \"·e 'shape [our] 
identities bv projecting [ourselves) toward the future' Oopling, 83). Thus, when we 
introspect, our seh-es are elusive to us. This is because the consciousness reflecting and 
the consciousness reflected upon are different. Since there is, at the very least, a 
temporal difference between the consciousness reflecting and the consciousness reflected 
upon, it seems that consciousness is ne\"er fully able to capture itself. This is what Sartre 
means when he stares that 'if we attempt to grasp [rhe refl ecting consciousness) as 
reflecting, it vanishes and we fall back on the reflection' (Same b , 76). It 15 important, 
howeyer, not to con fuse the vie\v that the self is elusive and non-fixed with the view that 
there is no sel f, or that the word 'self experiences a failure o f reference. \\'hen we 
introspect, it is not the case that we find no self, but simply that we cannot fully capture 
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ourseh-es, due to our freedom and our future-directedness. \X:e do experience ourselves 
as haying certain properties, but we do not experience ourselves as ha\·ing them in the 
fixed and readily accessible way that sincerity 'would require1!!. Secondl ~' , on the level of 
the individual's interaction with society, it fails to pro\-ide scope for criticism of that 
relation, tnerely seIying to enforce and reinforce existing social struc tures. 
\'\:e thus have reason turn to look for a new ideal to which we would have greater reason 
to adhere, given the critique laid out in this section. Such an ideal \vould have to satisfy 
the criterion of allO'wing scope for taking a cri tical stance with respect to society and the 
criterion of allowing a critical stance with respect to the self. This is the ideal that both 
Trilling and I term olltbentidty. For Trilling, authenticity suggests 'a more strenuous moral 
experience than "sincerity" does, a more exigent conception of the self and what being 
true to it consists in, a wider reference to the universe and man's place in it, and a less 
acceptant and genial "iew of the social circumstances of life' (Trilling, 11 ). The ideal of 
authenticity is thus a far more critical ideal than that of sincerity, implying a 'downward 
rnO\·emenf through all cultural superstructures to some place where all movement ends, 
and begins' (Trilling, 11). The need for authenticity is motinted because our society and 
culture need criticism which requires both a le\-el of interpretation of circumstances not 
afforded to us by sinceriry and a critical rela tion to the self which sincerity fails to 
provide. 
4. Towards a positive account 
~-\t this stage of the thesis, a definition of what authenticity is must remain largely a 
sketch 1'J. This is in part because the definition of authenticity at this point is a negatiye 
one, and in part because of the nature of the concept of authenticity. ..-\uthenticity, as 
discussed in the pre\·ious section, is a more comprehensiye term than sincerity and must 
be distinguished from it. This is because authenticity aims far more strongly at being 
critical than sincerity does. Authenticity calls upon us both to question Ollr society and 
to question ourselves. Thus. part of the definition of authenticity is that it is not 
sinceritr. \\'hat authenticity shares with sincerity, howeyer, is the call to self-knowledge. 
II' This is becaust: we do nor han: rht:st: properties in the same wa~- thar thjn~s can hI: said to han: 
propt:!rtlt:s, as discusst:u in sectiun 4 bduw. 
19 _-\r this stage, all I am aiming at is a working ddiniuoo of autht:nticiry which wiiJ be focalised through 
:":ietzscht's account (Chapter 2.) aou refined lhwugh a surplt:mt:ntation of this accounr (Chaprer 3) to 
crt:ate a fulh- flt.:~hed-()ur Jdinition. 
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In order to critique one's society and one's self, one ftrst needs to knO\V the self that is to 
be critiqued and do the critiquing:!!). 
The other issue surrounding giying a definition of authenticity at this stage is the nature 
of the concept. In the first chapter of his book, In Seani) arAlI/henlicily: FlVm Ki,r/:.egaard 
10 Comlls, Jacob Golomb begins by stating that the term 'authenticity' may 'very well resist 
definition ' (Golomb, 7). He gives two reasons for this. Firstly, the word is used in 'so 
many different contexts' (Golomb, 7). Golomb does not elaborate on this point, but he 
presumably means that authenticity is a term that is used in a number of different fields 
or disciplines (e.g. phil osoph,', psychology, art histon') and which carries differen t 
connotations and definitional baggage in each one. Secondly, he draws attention to the 
problem of 'the philosophical nature of [authenticity's] meaning' (Golomb, 7), which he 
views as being the fundamental barrier to defining the term. 
Golomb cites Sartre in order to defend this point. For Sartre, the word 'authenticity' 
does not 'denote "ob jective qualities" such as those associated with the notions of 
sincerity and honesty, qualities one predicates of "the person" In the same way one 
asserts ... that "the table is round or square'" (Sartre, quoted 10 Golomb, 7). The 
objective quality associated with sincerity, for example, is a congruence between avowal 
and actual feeling. This passage raises two important pomts . The first of these is that 
'authenticity' is not (for Sartre and Golomb) a term possessed of a finite list of criteria 
that will, if enough of them are ful ftlled, allow us to apply the term to someone. 
Secondly, Sarrre is drawing our attention to the dis analogy between persons (or selves) 
and pln-sical ob jects such as tables . The disanalogy runs, not along Cartesian lines (selyes 
are imm aterial, physical objects are material), but along the lines that the self has being-
for-itself (and as such is free and therefore constantly changing and developing) and a 
physical object has being-in-itself (and is thus fixed and fully determined by its 
properties). In other \vords, selves are not fixed entities, and predicating a complete list 
of their properties will not be sufficient to define them" . 
The two pre,; ous sections have served to pro"ide us with guidelines both for a positiye 
account of authenticity. In this section, I \vill explain what these guidelines are, 
1<> This Joe~ nor reYu1re an assumption ()f a fixed self. as \vill be uemonsrratt:!d below. 
21 _\s we han: seen in the prevIous stcuon, it is exactly this clisanaloh'T that sinct:rity fails to teco!-,'l1ise 
Later in this st!ctioo we will set: hu\v authenticity dots not fall into the same error. 
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demonstrate how authenticity is able to meet the criteria that they set and show why this 
pro\'ides moth'arion for our adopting authenticity as an ethical ideal. 
In the critique of sincerity abo\·e. there were four major problems that led to its decline 
as an ethical ideal. If authenticity is to succeed where sincerity failed, then it must avoid 
these problems. The four problems are as follows: 
1. Sincerity treats being true to oneself merely as a means to the end of being true to 
others. 
2. Sincerity treats rising above one's social station as unethical, and serves to enforce 
and reinforce existing social structures. 
3. Sincerity assumes both that consciousness is completely transparent to itself and that 
there can be an unmediated presentation of the self to the other. 
4. Sincerit\· assumes an ontology of self in wllich the self is fixed. 
Thus, authenticity must ayoid each of these problems (or, at the "crY least, do a better 
Job of ayoiding them than sincerity does), whilst also providing scope for critical 
examination of society and of self. 
In addressing how authenticity ayoids these problems, I will begin with 4., since it is 
authenticity's insistence on an ontology in which the self is not fixed that directly allows 
it to ,,'oid this problem and indireccly allows it to avoid the other three as well. 
In both sincerity and authenticity, there is a demand upon us to know ourseh-es. In his 
book, Selfkllow/,dg' olld th, Sell', Da,'id Jopling prm'ides a ven' useful link between self, 
knowledge and ontologies of self. The link is prm'ided by the fac t that any theon' of 
self-knowledge, its acquisition and value assumes a particular ontology of self. According 
to J opting, there are three major rraditions with respect to theories of self-knowledge in 
\\'estern philosoph\·. The first of these holds that self-knowledge is 'a yirtue expressed in 
prudential acoon' that is essential for the good life G opling, 3). Proponents of this 
tradition are ~\ri storle and Socra tes. The second tradition news self-knowledge as a 
'morally" valuable but largely unrealisable goal' Gopling, 3). Its unrealisability is due to 
'the eiusiyeness of the self which is its putati,'e object' Gapling, 3). Proponents of this 
tradition include Heraclitus, Sartre and Nietzsche. The third tradition sees self-
~~ ).1\- thank:: to Dr Sam .... mrha \ 'icc for dircccin/-: mt: to rhi:> ,·cn· u:>t:ful book. 
~., Jopling abo u:>t:> rhe word 'moral' inttrchanj.!,tably for botb· what I baYt rermed 'moral' and whar I ban-
termcd 't:thical'. 
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knowledge as (a form of self-reflexive critique' because of 'its destructive impact on 
cOn":entional ways of understanding the self, and because of its potential for moral and 
psychological destabilisation' Gopling, 3). Jopling cites Richard Rom·'s post-modern 
account of the self as the paradigm example of a theory in this tradition. 
The first tradition assumes that the self 'is something that is knowable in the first place' 
Gopling, 5). If thi s assumption is false, then the part that self-knowledge plays in being 
,"irtuous is problematised. Sincerirv adheres to this sort of theon" of self-knowledge" 
because (as argued in section 3 above) it assumes that the self is in fact the sort of thIng 
that is completeh" knowable. According to the ideal of sincerit\", self-knowledge (which 
is necessary to being true to oneself) is essential {Q yiItue, and can be achieved because 
there is a fixed own self to be discovered and known. The second tradition denies this 
assumpuon. \,(1Ulst it views self-knowledge as morally ,..luable, it holds that it is not a 
fully realisable ideal 'because the self is elusi,"e and cannot be adequateh" identified and 
conceptualised as it is ill itself Gopling, 5, my emphasis). Jopling gi,"es two ways of 
construing this statement. The weak construal is that <there is always more about the self 
than can be identified and represented at anyone time', since the self is too complex to 
come into the full view of the person attempting to know it G opling, 5). Howe,-er, 
Jopling asserts, this may be said to be 'trivially true' of knowledge in general, not Just self-
knowledge Gopling, 5). The strong construal is that our mental capacities are structured 
in such a Wal" that ' there is a blind spot to the self and its existence' Gopling, 5). This 
implies that the self is something that 's,"stematicalh· eludes knowledge' Gopling, 5). It 
seems that there rna," be a third possible construal of this position, which is supported by 
Jopling's use of the words 'in itself' in his formulation of it. Self-knowledge is not a fully 
achievable ideal because the self is not the sort of thing that is amenable to complete 
knowledge, precisely because it is not a thing. \\"e cannot know what the self is like in 
itself, since its being is not subsumed by this. The self, as discussed on a number of 
occasions abo~:e, cannot be subsumed (0 being-in-itself, as it has (he capacity for 
development and change. The third tradition also denies the assumption of a fixed self. 
It holds that even if we have knowledge of our 'desires, beliefs, and emotions' and of our 
(character traits, life history and moral personality', there will still be 'more fundamental 
dimensions' of the self that we ,,@ lack knowledge of Gopling, 8). If we are to acquire 
self-knowledge which will be of ethIcal relevance, then we must 'call into question the 
framework in tenns of which one conventionally or habitually thinks about one's self 
. " 
22 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Gopling, 9). Ethicalh· releyant self-knowledge thus requires a critical attitude to self (or 
(0 the ways in which one conceh'es of oneself). To avoid being merely destrucu\Oc, 
'critical self-knowledge must be placed ultimately in the service of a higher end: namely 
liberation, enlightenment or olllbmlicitj Gopling, 10, my emphasis). 
Theories of authenticity subscribe in large part to the second tradition \\;th respect to 
self-knowledge. _ \ , mentioned brie£lr in the second section of this ess,,·, theorists of 
authenticity, such as Nietzsche. place great importance on the selPs capacity for 
development and change. This is because authenticity as an ideal promotes the continual 
development of the self, denying that there is a fixed, object-like self to which one is to 
be true. The authentic project of forming one's own self 'entails reluctance to conform 
to any external "is" or "ought" or to seek some transcendental "ought'" (Golomb, 13). 
Thus, the ontolog\· assumed by the ideal of authenticin· is fundamentally at odds with 
that assumed by the ideal of sinceri ty. ...\gains[ sincerity's assumption of a fixed self, 
authenticity affirms and embraces the £lux o f the self as the ' -erY condition o f the ideal's 
possibili ty. Thus authenticin- avoids the fourth problem encountered by sincerin·. 
From the above discussion of jopling's account of theories of self-knowledge, it 
bec01nes clear ho\v authenticity avoids the thud rcason for sincerit;. 's decline. Sincerity 
assumes the complete transparency of consciousness to itself and the possibility of 
unmediated presentation of self to other. Gi,-en authenticity's rejection of an ontology 
of a fL,ed self, and its adherence to a theory of self-knowledge that denies that self-
knowledge is ever a fully realisable ideal, it does not assume the complete transparency of 
consciousness to itself. Nietzsche, for example, is at pains to point out that ther~ are 
driYes, passions and motiyarions which influence our conduct, but of which we may be 
unaware. :\uthenticin- can also accommodate the difficulty of giving an immediate 
presentation of the self to others. Given that there are aspects of my self of which J mar-
be unaware, and that my self-knowledge will never be complete, I may be mistaken about 
myself and this can be transferred onto my presentation of my self to others. 
4-\uthenriciry 3yoids sincerity's second problem in twO ways. Firstly, if the self is not 
fixed, but constantlr in future-directed flux, then it cannot be determined by an existing 
set of circumstances such as one's social station. Secondly, given that the trurd type of 
theory of self-knowledge, which is drawn on in sen-ice of the ideal of authenticity, 
requires a questioning of existing modes of kno\ving the self, this means that one who 
has accepted the ideal of authenticity has 'not accepted uncritically any conventional and 
ready-to-hand form, of self-understanding' Oopling, 2). Thus, if one is to be authentic, 
one cannot accept the definition of the self by social station, nor can one sanction the 
accurate reflection of a socially defined self as virtuous. 
The last of the problems to which sincerity falls prey i, that is accords only instrumen tal 
value to being true to oneself, as being true to oneself is only a means to the end of being 
true to others. Authenticity, if it i, to avoid falling prey to the same problem, need not 
necessarily accord only inherent \'alue to be true to oneself, but it must not accord lJJereD' 
instrumental yalue to being true to oneselfJ. It is clear that authenticity does accord 
some instrumental \'alue to being true to oneself. In being true to oneself \"ia authentic 
self-creation, one is in a position to effect change in ethical systems and society. 
Howe,"er, the ideal of authenticity also values being true to oneself for its own sake. 
Even if authenticity cannot be brought to the level of an objective, normative moral 
theory, it can be a 'personal, corrective ideal' (Golomb, 205). The guest for self-
knowledge thus becomes something valuable in itself, since even if it fail , to h,,-e societal 
benefit" it prevents the betrayal of one's self. 
Thus the ideal of authenticity escapes the four problem, encountered b,· the ideal of 
sincerity. Gi"en that it escapes these problems, and provides scope for criticism of both 
society and self, it is an ideal that we have more rca son to pursue than the ideal of 
sincerity. 
:!J This is analogous to tht: Kantian injunction rhat wt: always treat pt:oplt: as ends and ne\"er mt:rdy a:-: 
means . In ct:rtain siruations, we will treat reoplt: (t: .g. a bus drivt:r or chef) as means (to ow: dt::-:tinaool1 or 
food) in some st:nst:, bur as long as wt: simultaneously ut:at them as t:nds, we are nor immoral. 
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Chapter 2 
Nietzsche's ideal of authentici ty 
In this chapter I examine the ideal of authenticity presented to us by Nietzsche. This will 
proyide us with a concrete idea of what an ideal of authenticity would look like, and of 
what would be necessary to live successfully according to such an ideaL In section 1, I 
elucidate Nietzsche's overall project, arguing that the focus of his critigue is the ethical. 
The second section examines Nietzsche's methodology in Olltbe Cenealo.fJ' of Morals, so ., 
to set up his critique of the ascetic ideal. In section 3, I examine Nietzsche's critique of 
the ascetic ideal. I t is this ideal that he views as his opponent, and for which he believes 
his ideal of authenticity to be the antidote. In section 4, J present an anal~'sis and 
interpretation of Nietzsche's counter-ideal of eternal return, arguing that it is to be 
viewed as a particular attitude to life, in which self-knowledge plays a fundamental role. 
1. T he O verall N ietzschean Project 
A fundamental part of Nietzsche's philosophical project, and one that can be traced back 
to his earliest works, is a critique of \vhat he terms 'morality'. There arc two interpretive 
problems that arise out of this critigue. The fi rst is what Nietzsche's attitude to morality 
is, and the second is what the scope of his critigue is. In this section I shall discuss each 
of these problems in turn, arguing that Nietzsche's project IS not aimed at the destruction 
of morality Jimplidter and that Nietzsche's use of the word 'morality' covers both what I 
have termed 'ethics' and what I have termed 'morality':!:'. From this it will emerge that, 
while Nietzsche does criticise normative theories (e.g. utilitari anism and I<antianism), 
these do nOt form the focus of his account. The focus of his account is, in fact, 
directives abou t how we ollghtto live, i.e. ethical ideals. 
One o f the sources of the fIrst intcrpreti\"e problem is N ietzsche's reference to himself as 
'the fIrst immoralist' (EH, 1\' : 2). This does not, howenr, mean that he is opposed to 
the very notion of morality:!(', or that he wishes to 'promote immorality, i.e. , to encourage 
people to perform immoral actions' (Clark, xvii). Nietzsche explicitly says of himself that 
'it goes without saying that J do not deny - unless I am a fool - that many actions called 
~~ See Chapter 1, Section 1. ':\ Iind1n~ the Gap', 
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immoral ought to be a\yoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done 
and encouraged - but I think the one should be encouraged and the other ,,-oided jOr 
differellt reasolls thall hilherto' (D: 103). From this it is clear that N ietzsche neither desires 
the encouragement of all that has preyioush' been called immoral, nor does he desire the 
destruction of all that has pre,-ioush- been called moral. If N ietzsche 1S not to be a cri tic 
of morali ty simp/idler, the 'ought' in the above passage must be an ethical ought. In other 
words, if he defends the encouragement of 'moral' behaviour and the a\Toidance of 
'immoral' behayiour in purely prudential, non-ethical terms, it may seem that he is not in 
fact defending morality at all . 
Nietzsche's description of himself as an immoralist comes after a discussion of the 
notion of creativity with respect to values, as it is used in Tlms Spoke Zarathllstra. Here he 
discusses the notion as fo llows: 'he who has to be a creator in good and evil, truly, has 
fi rst to be a destroyer and break values. Thus the greatest evil belongs with the greatest 
good: this, howenr, is the creative good' (2, II : 'Of Self-overcoming'). According to 
Nietzsche, being an immoralist makes him 'the annihilator" par e.wel/me'" (E H, IV: 2). 
The reason he needs to be an immoralist is in order to create ne\v values. The notion of 
creativity for Nietzsche is an ethical one::!!!. The 'creative good' is not a purely non-ethical 
good, and thus to defend immoralism by appeal to it makes this defence an ethical one. 
Thus rhe 'ought' in the passage from Da,ylmak abo,-e is an ethical ought. This 
demonstrates that Nietzsche's immoralism does not mean that he is opposed to the very 
notion of morality (which would make him an amoralist), but that it means that he is 
opposed to the blind and unquestioning acceptance of moral norms, without an 
examination of the reasons for which the,- are held. Immoralism is thus an attitude:!" to 
morality that is sceptical in the common language sense of the word. In other words, it 
involves a wil lingness to question the phenomenon of morality, without denying that it 
does or should exist. 
The second interpreti,-e problem is, according to Brian Leiter, ' [olne of the standing 
problems in the interpretation of Nietzsche', that of defining 'the precise Jeop' of his 
:i.o .\s is argued b~' e.g. Philippa Four in her paper, ':t'-j"jetzsche's Immoralism' (in Schacht (ed.) }\-itl:::.sdJe. 
Glm%g),. ~\1Qra.Ij(j'. Berkeley: L'ninfsity of California Press, 1994). 
T The discrepancy in translation is due ro the fact thar Eat H OI1,Q is in the Kaufmann translation, and 
Zorafhmlra is in the H()llin~dale translation . Kaufmann uses 'annihilawr' for Hollingdale's 'destroyer'. 
::!J. Ir is fhe notion of self-cn:ati\-ity thar ~rounds the ethical ideal of authenticity that he proposes. as is 
discussed in the reSf (If tins chapter . 
~" It is an attitUl"!e thar :S-ierzscht:: shart::s with Hume, as discussed in section 2 of this chapter 
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crinque of morality' (Leiter, 7+). There are two aspects to the scope of Nietzsche's 
account. The first is a definition of what his target is, and the second is the classification 
of this target i.e. whether it is in fact moral or ethicaL 
Leiter provides a starting point for a definition of Nietzsche's target. Leiter suggests t\.vo 
possible interpretations of the scope of Nietzsche's critique, both of whlCh he rules out. 
The first is that Nietzsche is 'simply a critic of all morality'.:)!! Part of the SOUIce of the 
problem here is that N ietzsche uses the same German word 'typically lI1..oral, sometimes 
Moralildf (Leiter, 7+) both for what he attacks and for what he 1S in favour o f. Thus, 'on 
pain of inconsistency' (Leiter, 74) , we must be able to distinguish the sense of 'lTIorality' 
of which Nietzsche is critical from the sense of 'morality' that he retains. The second is 
that he is 'only a critic of a particular kind of morality' (Leiter, 74), such as Christian or 
'European' morality. These types of morality are boclies of doctrine or dogma defined 
purely in terms of their form. Thus Leiter suggests tlia t what Nietzsche is critical of is 
not moralities only 'with a particular content (e.g. 'Christian' or 'European' morality), but 
moralities of a particular form . This sort of morality is what Leiter terms 'morality in 
[Nietzsche's] pejorative sense' or MPS (Leiter, 74). 
,\ccorcling to Leiter, all normative systems (of Wh1Ch MPS is one type) have both 
descriptive and normative components (Leiter, 78) . In other \vords, normative systems 
presuppose 'a particular descriptive account of human agency' (Leiter, 78), which in turn 
makes sense of the system's normative claitns, and 'embrace norms which favor the 
interests of some people, perhaps at the expense of others' (Leiter, 78). ,-\ normative 
system qualifies as J\"lPS if and only if it presupposes three descriptive claims about the 
nature of human agency (the descriptive component) and/or if it embraces norms which 
are detrimental to the 'highest men' and advantageous to the 'lowest' (the normative 
component). Leiter argues that this is because people '(generally) hold parncular 
philosophical and metaphyslCal ,"iews because they support their moral beliefs' and that 
these moral beliefs are in turn ("enerally) held 'because they favor the interests of those 
agents ' (Leiter, 78-79). A clear example of this phenomenon 1S the ascetic ideal, 
Nietzsche's major target In the third essay of On 1/;, Genealogy of Morals, which I will 
cliscuss in detail in section 3 below. :\ccorcling to Leiter, the descnpnve component 
alone is not sufficienT for a normative systetTI to qualify as l\IPS, but it is, nevertheless, 
:10 ~-\s I haye arhrued abo\"e, ir is clear that thi,.; is nor rbt cast:. 
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yery Importan t. It is the descripti,-e component of ~vfPS that is of the most interest to us 
here. 
There are three descriptive claims about hUlnan agency that are presupposed by the 
normative judgements ofMPS. These are that 
1. 'agents possess a will capable of free and autonomous choice' (Free Will) 
2. the self is 'sufficiently transparent that agents' action can be distinguished on the 
basis of their respective motives' (Transparency of Self) 
3. agents are 'sufficiently similar that one moral code is appropriate for all" (Similarity) 
(Leiter, 80). 
The formulation of the second of these claims is problematic. This is because, as Leiter 
formulates it, it leayes no room at all for motives in the description or evaluation of an 
agent's action. It seems that, as I argued in section 3 of Chapter 1, even if the self is not 
completely transparent, we are stiU able to distinguish at least some of our motivations. 
Nietzsche does, for example, distinguish the motivation of philosophers in adopting the 
ascetic ideal from that of the priests. Thus the formulation of the second claim ought to 
be that the self is sufficiently transparent that agents' action can be distinguished solely on 
the basis of their respcctiyC motives. This formulation leaves room for some role for 
motintion, whilst admitting that many of our motives (e.g. those involved in self-
deception, or our instincts and drives) may be opaque to us. 
In combination, Leiter's three claims ground and render intelligible the normative 
judgements of MPS. This is because Leiter believes the normative judgements of MPS 
to be characterised by three traits that correspond to the three claims above. The 
normati,-e judgements of MPS: 
1. 'hold agents responsible for their actions' 
II . 'evaluate and "rank" the motives for which agents act' 
III. 'presuppose that "morality" has universal applicability' (Leiter, 80). 
Given the nature of the normative judgements of l\lPS, as characterised bv these three 
claims, Leirer argues that, if any of the three descripti"e claims about agenc,' fail, the 
corresponding kind of judgement cannot be justified. Thus, 
I. 'If agents lacked "free will" the,' could nOt be held responsible for their actions' 
11. 'If agent motives could not be distingui shed then no cnluative distinctions could 
be drawn among acts in terms of their motives' 
11L 'If agents \vere, in fact, different in some overlooked but relevant respect, then it 
would, at least, not be prima fa cie apparent that one morality should ha\"e universal 
applicability' (Leiter, 80-81). 
Each of these claims is problematic. Firstly, it is far from clear, as has been frequently 
argued in recent years·;I, that deterrninism is in fact incompatible 'With Inoral 
responsibility. Secondly, as I have already mentioned above, the self is sufficiently 
transparent for some motivation to be distinguishable. It is aJso clear that Nietzsche 
does, in the Gemolog)', for example, engage in some ranking of motivation s. The self-
affirming motivation of the nobles in the creation of "alues is preferred to the ressmtimmt 
that characterises slave valuation and the purely pragmatic motivation of philosophers in 
'adopting' or taking on the trappings of the ascetic ideal is preferred to the reJ"JeJltimi.:nt 
that motivates the priests and the self-deceived moti\'ation of the slaves. Thirdly, the 
problem of universal applicability arises because Leiter fails to draw the distinction 
between ethics (where universality is inappropriate) and morality (which fal ls precisely in 
the scope of the universal). This is problematic because, as I shall argue below, this is a 
distinction that Nietzsche does draw, albeit not as explicitly as \X!illiams or Foucaul t. 
Despite its problems, Leiter's account is useful in pro\-iding a framework within which to 
understand the scope of Nietzsche's account. It is especially pertinent because it dra\vs 
our attention to the fact that Nietzsche's target is form- rather than content-based. 
\\11ile the content of the ascetic ideal is problematic, as will be demonstrated below, it is 
its form that makes it a target for Nietzsche. 
In B~yolld Good and Em"!, Nietzsche Con1IT1ents that 'morality' can have a 'narrower' sense 
(BGE: 32) and thus, bl" implication, a broader sense. This is a distinction between ethics 
and morality, in "'."ery similar terms to those used by \"\Iilliams. \"\thilst N ietzsche is 
ob\Tiously critical of morality in the narrower sense, arguing that we should tnO\'e beyond 
it into the supra-moral (BGE: 32), he is also, and more pervasi"el)" critical of ideals that 
fall under the scope of morality in the broader sense, or ethics. This becomes clear if we 
examine his critique of the ascetic ideaI3:! . The ascetic ideal is nOt a moral ideal, but an 
ethical one masquerading as a moral one. It does not merell" pro\'ide rules or prmciples 
that must be obeyed, but gives directi\'es about how one ought to li"e, what one ought to 
H E.~ . by Bernard \, 'illiams in 'Ho\v fret! does rhe \\."il1 need to be~' (in J1akil1,g mm of h.JIIIrJJ:i!r alld o//;tl" 
pbilosopbi.a/ paptr.r, Cambridge, CCP. 1995), R. Jay \\ ·allace in Rupoflribililj· and Ihe .\1om' Senlilllw/J 
(Cambridge, ~[ass.> Han'ard CP, 1996) and Harry Frankfurt in 'Freedom of the \"·ill and rhe Concept of a 
Person' (in Jound! ~lPb.;,'osoph)'> 68: 1) . 
. \~ This will be discussed in greater detail in section 3 bdow. 
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belie,"e and what one's relationship to oneself and the world (and the other world) ought 
to be. The ascetic ideal helps itself to universal applicability when it has no right to do 
so. The sort of uniyersal applicability that it claims is the sort of universal applicabili"" 
that metaphysical truths are supposed to have. In other words, its claims are supposed ro 
be objectiyely true and therefore applicable to all agents. However, as Nietzsche argues 
in the third essay of the GeIJealogy. the ascetic ideal's claims arc neither objective nor truc. 
They arc morjvated by the reJJel11jl1Jellt o f the priests in a l::tst-ditch attclnpr to retain their 
position and gain a feeling of power. Both the ideal's metaphysic (with its strong 
emphasis on the other-worldly) and its ontology of personhood (with its denigration of 
the body and the passions) are wrong. Thus it is inappropriate for the ascetic ideal to 
claim uni'"crsal applicability both because it is an ethical ideal and because, c,'en if it were 
not, it would not be able to have the type of universality it reguires. 
N ietzsche's concern with the ascetic ideal is its form - it is an ethical ideal that attempts 
to help itself to the universal applicability that is appropriate only to moral ideals. It is 
this that a110\.\"5 Nietzsche to posit his counter-ideal of authenticity, as its form is an 
antidote to that of the ascetic ideal. It is to a discussion of the ascetic ideal and the 
counter-ideal of authentici,," proposed by Nietzsche that I now turn, beginning with a 
discussion of 011 tbe Cm,alog)' of Morals. 
2. On the Genealogy of M orals 
_ \ s I mentioned in the first section of this chapter, a critique of what he terms (morality' 
forms a central part of Nietzsche's philosophical project. It is a theme that is possibly 
most clearly dealt with in 0" tbe Cellealogy of Morals. There are two reasons for this. The 
first is that the Cmea/oJ), was published in 1887, the penultimate productive year of 
Nietzsche's li fe, and can rhus be viewed as a mature presentation of his ,·iews on the 
subject.:;) The second is tbat it is, from a stylistic point of vie\ll, one of Nietzsche's 
clearest books. It is divided into three closely linked essays, each dealing with an aspect 
of his critiguc of morality. The fIISt essay deals with the origins of the values 'good' and 
'el'il', the second "ith the moral(ised) psychology of guilt and bad conscience and the 
third offers a critigue of the ascetic ideal. 
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If we examine the place of the Gt'lIealo2J1 in Nietzsche's ceuyre. it becomes clear exactly 
what he aims ,vith it were. The title page of the original edition bears the words: '~.\ 
Sequel to ~ly Last Book, Beyolld eood alld E,ojl, \"'hich it is Meant to Supplement and 
Clari!')" (Gay, 439). Thus Nietzsche views the eenealog)' as a continuation and 
clarification of the themes in Beyolld eood alld Ellil, among which is a critique of moralit\' 
is prominent. In a letter to Burckhardt (22/9/1886), he describes Beyolld Good alld Eml as 
saying 'the same things as my Zarat/JI(stra, but differently, very differently' (guoted in 
Kaufmann, 182). Once again, a critique of a particular kind of morality forms a cenrral 
part of this work. Thus, 011 tbe Gel/ealogy of Morals, B~yolld Good alld Evil and Tblls Spoke 
ZaratlJJlJira are to be yiewed as containing three treatments of the same theme, each a 
refinement or clarification of the pre,-ious, with the Gmea/og)' as the pinnacle of the 
refining process. 
In order to understand the Genealogy properly, one must first have an understanding of 
the genealogical method that Nietzsche employs in it. I shall discuss two facets of 
genealogy. Fitstly, I will provide an account of what criteria must be fulfilled in order for 
a method to count as a genealogical method, drawing on Raymond Geuss' account. 
Secondly, I will discuss Nietzsche's views about his genealogical method and how he 
believes it to be different from that of those he terms the 'English psychologists';' (G\l, 
1: 1). I will do this through a comparison of Hume and Nietzsche, specifical'" with 
respect to their accounts of the origin of justice. 
According to Geuss, N ietzsche's genealogy is 'the exact reverse' of what he terms 'tracing 
a pedigree' (Geuss, 1). \1;·'I1en one traces a pedigree (of a person, a thing, a custom or a 
value) what one aims to do is to legitimise or attribute positive ,-alue to the subject of the 
pedigree. In order to do this, one must assume that there is a 'singular origin' of the 
subject of the pedigree that is the 'actual source' of the \'alue one atrributes to it (Geuss, 
3). One then traces an 'unbroken line of succession' (Geuss, 3) from that origin to the 
subject of the pedigree, by a series of steps 'that preserye or enhance whatever yalue is in 
question' (Geuss, 3). By conrrast, giving the genealogy of something (in Nietzsche's case, 
.U :"-.laudemarie Clark holds rhat the Gellto/O!!)" is ;-":it::tzschc's '''fmisht:d'' thoughts on its major topics' (Clark, 
X" ). 
q Th.is is a tt:rm that :-:-it:tzscht: st:ems to mean vt::ry broadly. as his targt:rs indudt: Paul Ret:, a German, and 
David H ume, a Scotsman. 
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the system of "alues and customs that he terms <morality" ;) is generally undertaken to 
demonstrate a lack of legitimacy or positin value of the subject of the genealogy. This is 
because a genealogical method denies both the assumption that there is a singular origin 
of the subject of the genealogy, and that the origin of a thing and its purpose are linked 
in a \"alue-transmitting way. For Nietzsche, questions of origin and questions of purpose 
come apart - a thing's purpose does not explain its origin (eM II: 1~). Thus there can be 
no value-transmitting link between a thing's current purpose and its origins . This lends 
support to Nietzsche's project, which aims, not at legitimising <morality' and the values it 
asks us to accept, but at 'caliling] illto questioll' the "la/II' of these pa/lles' (eM, P: 6). 
Nietzsche contrasts his genealogical method with that of those he terms the 'English 
psychologists' (eM, I: 1), such as Ree and Hume. He criticises these genealogists of 
morality for haying an 'un historical' (eM, I: ~) approach to their subject. It may seem 
su'ange for Nietzsche to criticise them for being 'unhistorical', since genealogy is driven 
by the search for origins, which seems, in an obvious sense at least, to be a historical 
enterprise. However, what Nietzsche means is not that they fail to look for origins, but 
that, in their search for the origins of moral terms, they operate from the contemporary 
meaning and value attributed to these terms, thereby assuming that the meaning of such 
terms has been fixed and unchanging throughout their development. As tvfichel 
Foucault succinccly puts it, Ree <assumed that words kept their meaning ;(', that desires 
still pointed in a single direction, and that ideas retained their logic' (Foucault b, 341). In 
contrast, Nietzsche's genealogy denies this, by 'opposing the sentimental assumption that 
things we now ,"alue (for whate,"er reason) mllst have had an origin of which we would 
also apprm"e"- (Geuss, 4). In other words, the 'meanings' (in the Foucaultian sense 
discussed) of our moral terms may (and in fact do) change, and we must, if we are to be 
good genealogists, be constandy aware of this in our search for origins. It is this 
awareness that Nietzsche criticises the 'English psychologists ' for lacking . 
. 'l.'i .\s argued by Gc::uss, \\le ought TO ,"lew morality in \'\.'ittgemrcinian fashion as 't:ncompass[ing] a wide 
variety of different sorts of things that an: at beST conm:cred to each other by "family rt!semblances'" 
(Geu" b, 167) . 
. \10 It stems that what Foucault has in mind here is not only meaning in the sense:: if dcoorauoo, but abo in 
the scnse of connotation. \\'nils( words, e.g. punishment, may keep thcir (derence !o a family of pracricts, 
the \\ ay in which these practices art: viewed, c.g. in h::rms of their purpose and origin, changes, and this 
change:: may be obscured from us . 
" This point "\vill bt:come clear when I WSCU% the orihtins of the ascetic idt!al in section 3 below. 
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The contrast between Nietzsche and those he yiews as his opponents will become clearer 
if we compare Nietzsche and Burne. They have in common that they both attempt to 
pro\Tide genealogies of morality and that they are both naturalists . Howeyer, their 
approaches to their ,ubject matter are different. :\ccording to Leiter, both Nietzsche and 
Hurne are 'methodological naturalists' (Leiter, 6) . Both philosophers operate from the 
belief that philosophical inquilT ... should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the 
SCIence,' (Leiter, 3). The wa,' in which this continuity is supposed to occur is by bringing 
the experimental method 'of testing progressively refined claims against experience' 
(Leiter, 4) into the practice of philosophy. This is particularly clear in the case of Hume, 
who subtitled the first edition of ,1 Treatisf of Human j\'alurf '~-\n ~-\ttempt to introduce the 
experimental !\Ierhod of Reasoning into Moral Subjects'. Driven b,' the desire to explain 
morality in naturalistic terms, without recourse to God or metaphysics, each of these 
philosophers 'construct[s] a quasi-speculati,'e theon' of human nature to explain certain 
features of human belief systems' (Leiter, 10), in this case, the feature, related to 
morality, 
.-\. brief comparison of Hume and Nietzsche's accounts of the origin of jus tice will suffice 
to demonstrate the differences in their genealogical methods. Hume presents his reader 
with a dilemma about the origin of justice. Its origin is either 'our reflecting on [its 
tendency to "promote public utility and support ciYil society"]' or 'like. [the] appetites 
... and [the] passions [it] arises from a simple original instinct in the human breast, which 
nature has implanted' (Hume, 201 ). The latter option is ruled out by an examination of 
the empirical facts. It i, clear that the sentiment of justice i, one that has to be learned, 
not one that comes naturally to us. Hurne argues that, if we were to '[r]evcrse in any 
considerable circumstance, the condition of man' by producing 'extreme abundance or 
extreme necessi,,·' or by '[i]mplant[ing] in the human breast perfect moderation or 
perfect rapaciousness and malice' (Hume, 188), we would render justice obsolete. This is 
because, in situations such as these, justice ceases to have any use to society. Thus, 
according to Hume, 'public utili,,' is the .1'0/' origin of justice' (Hume, 183). 
Nietzsche's account of the origin of justice is, in one sense, similar to Burne's. He also 
denies that a sense of justice is an instinct that we all possess inherently. :\ccording to 
Nietzsche, justice exists only after the institution of la\\! (not, as was argued by Duhring'w" 
;~ In hi~ book, Tht J "(/fill ~lLi.fr: A COlfrJI ill PhiloJopllj'. 
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after the perpetration of a harm) (GM, II: 11). The institution of law is designed to take 
the object of re"enge (the perpetrator of a hann) out of the hands of those who desire 
revenge (those against whom the harm was perpetrated). There are a number of means 
by 'which this can be done. These include the substitution for revenge of some sort of 
'moral' struggle against those elements of society which arc deemed to be the 'enemies of 
peace and order' (GM, II, 11), the introduction and imposition of settlements, and the 
standardisation of equivalents for harms perpetrated. The last option im:olves what we 
would term punishment. Thus, justice is at base what happens when we 'sanctify 
re\'enge' (GM, II: 11), rendering it part of the realm of moralit\'. Thus, by moralising 
re\"enge, we create a new moral category, justice, which is given a positive value. The 
difference between N ietzsche's account and Hume's thus consists in the fac t that Hume, 
although he questions the origin of justice, still takes as a starting point the assumption 
(hat justice has, and has always had, a positive value. N ietzsche, on the other hand, 
questions not only the otigill but also the 1)0/1It' of justice. Given the origin of justice, its 
pretensions of purity and having the best interests of all concerned at heart are 
undermined. Once again we are made aware that the origin and purpose, and thus the 
valuation, of a practice come apart. 
\X."e are no\>/ in a position to examine Nietzsche's critique of morality in 0" tbe Genealogy ~r 
Morals. It is not my aim in this section to provide a detailed exposition of everything that 
Nietzsche covers in this work. I aim to set up his argument against the ascetic ideal, so 
as to demonstrate that he is critical of it because it is an ethical ideal that attempts to 
claim the sort of uni\'ersal applicabilit\' that is appropriate only to moral ideals" . 
Nietzsche begins the Preface of the Genealogy with a statement th at is vital in setting up 
his argument against the ascetic ideal: '\\/e are unknown to ourselves, we men of 
knowledge' (GM, P: 1). Despite the great advances we continue to make in our 
knowledge of numerous fields, we lack self-knowledge. _\ccording to Nietzsche, this is 
'necessarily' so, because we 'ha\'e never sought ourseh'es' and so 'ho\v could it happen 
that we should everfind ourselves?' (GM, P: 1). :\s I argued in Section 1 of Chapter 1, 
self-knowledge is crucial to ethics. Nietzsche is here drawing our attention to this very 
point. If we are to conduct a meaningful inquiry into the value of our values, as he aims 
(Q do in the Genealogy, then we must know for whom these values are supposed to be 
\'J Thus, a discussion of his "iews on c.g. perspecrivism amI truth falls outside [he ~copt! of this projecL 
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yaluable. \'\:e cannot formulate a coherent ethic without knowing what kind of creature 
we are formulating it for. In other words, the que~tion 'How ought I to live?', in other 
words, '\'\·bat is the good life?', cannot be answered without pro\·iding an answer to the 
question The good life for whom?'. This is precisely the SOrt of consideration that will 
be of importance in putting fonvard a critique of the ascetic ideaL :\5 Geuss points out, 
'the question "\\,·'hat is the significance of ascetic ideals?,,-tll is incomplete; the full version 
would ha,-e to read: "\\''hat is the slgnificance of ascetic idealsfor .. . '" where the blank is 
filled in by some speci fication of a particular group of people' (Geuss, 18, m,' emphasis). 
If we view the ascetic ideal as something that ha s inherent significance (as it urges us to 
do), the different significances it may have for different groups of people, depending on 
their interests, are obscured from us. Our lack of self-knowledge thus creates a climate 
in which an ideal like the ascetic ideal can gain a footing and begin to flouri sh in the 
absence of questioning or criticism. 
3. The ascetic ideal 
Nietzsche describes the third essay of 011 Ib, C,",alog), of Mora!.r as providing an answer to 
the question of 'whence the ascetic ideal, the priests' ideal, deri\'es its tremendous power 
although it is the barm/1I1 ideal par '.wellelll'" (EH, III: CM). The answer is that it is 'not, as 
people may belien, because God is at work behind the priests bur faille de m;",,,." -
because it was the only ideal so far, because it had no rival' (EH, III: CM). In this 
section I discuss the ascetic ideal and its meaning for yarious groups of people, in order 
to draw out why Nietzsche finds it such a problematic ideal and how he believes it to 
have come to be the only ideal a\'ailable to us. 
The ascetic ideal is characterised by 'three great slogans' - 'poverty, humility, chastity' 
(CM, III: 8). These three words succinctly demonstrate the nlues that the ideal holds 
dear, values that it demands that its adherents accept, despite their seeming antipath,' to 
human nature. In accepting these values, it demands that irs adherents recognise the true 
abhorrence of their base human natures, their bodies and bodily desires. It is not, 
howc,"er, purely out of a distaste for these values that Nietzsche criticises the ascetic 
ideaL He takes issue with the ascetic ideal because of the form it takes. In order to see 
-til This is tht: yue~ti()n .\:it:tzscht:: takc::s himself to be answering in tht: third essay of the Gr.llealogy. which has 
the question as its tirle. 
~1 For lack of something berter. 
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clearly what this form is we must examine Nietzsche's discussion of the "alue or meaning 
that the ideal holds for various groups of people. 
Nietzsche's discussion of the meaning of ascetic ideals deals \vi th its significan ce for four 
groups of people: artists, philosophers, priests and the rest of humanity in generaL 
-ietzsche summarises these as follows: 
In the case of artists they mean nothing or too lTIany things~ 
in the case of philosophers and scholars something like a 
sense and in stinct for the most fayourable preconditions of 
higher spiritualit\'; ... in the case of the ph\'siologically deformed 
and deranged (the majol7ty of mortals) ... their chief weapon in 
the struggle against slow pain and boredom; in the case of priests 
their best instrument of power, also the "supreme" licence for 
power (eM, III: 1). 
unking all of these is Nietzsche's contention that '[eJvery animal ... instinctively strives 
for an optimum of fayourable conditions under which it can achieve its maximal 
feeling of power' (eM, III: 7) . In other words, human beings seek out those conditions 
that the\' take to be most f,,'ourable for their de\'elopment and fulfliment and thence 
take on those values or ideals that enable the maintenance of those conditions. 
Nietzsche begins his discussion of the meaning of ascetic ideals for artis ts with a 
commentary on \'\'agner's opera, Par.rifa!. He describes \\'agner as 'pay[ing] homage to 
chasti ty in his old age' (eM, Ill: 2). The reason that this is of importance is that, 
according to Nietzsche, it demonstrates a complete turnaround in the yalues to which 
the artist adhered - '\\'agner leaped over into his opposite' (eM, Ill: 2). This ability to 
make a jump from the celebration of sensuality that Nietzsche identifies in Die 
Meislersil/ger to the glorification of chastity that he identifies in Parsifal is key to 
Nietzsche's conclusion that ascetic ideals in the case o f artists mean 'lIothillg whatelier .. 
Or so man\' things it amounts to nothing at all' (GM, Ill : 5). This is because Nietzsche 
holds that artists 'do not stand nearl\' independently enough in the world and agail/sl the 
world' (eM, III: 5) for us to take their valuations seriously. Because of this they simply 
become the mouthpieces or instruments of prevailing doctrines and dogmas. GiYen this, 
they can make the ideal mean whatcHr they like, depending on the theme that they are 
pushing. The ideal is only 'adopted' for their own purposes, and thus holds no real 
meaning, either for the artist or the spectator/reader. 1n th e case of \\'agner, Nietzsche 
claims, th e artist used Schopenhauer, a respected philosopher, 'as his herald and 
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protection' (eM, III: 5). \,'bat Nietzsche means b,' th,S is that the impetus and 
justification for \Yagner's embracing of the ascetic ideal in fac t came from the authorit~­
enjoyed by Schopenhauer. 
Nietzsche leads on directly from his discussion of Schopenhauet's role in Wagner's 
embracing the ascetic ideal to a discussion of Schopenhauer's relation to ascetic ideals in 
order to begin his account of the meaning of ascetic ideals to philosophers. 
Schopenhauer, taking on board a Kantian conception of aesthetics, viewed the 
contemplation of beauty as giving us 'pleasure without in[erest~:!. This disinterested 
pleasure in turn induced in the spectator a 'calming of the will' (eM, III: 6). Nietzsche 
argues that [he attraction of this ascetic way of ,·ic\ving beauty lay for Schopenhauer in it 
providing a 'release from a torture' (eM, III: 6), in this case from the distracting 
influence of sexual desire or 'interestedness'. In order to concentrate properly on the 
higher intellectual and spiritual pursuits, such as philosophy, it is necessary to 'put a 
check on an unrestrained and irritable pride or a wanton sensuality' (eM, III: 8) . 
This leads us to the real meaning of ascetic ideals for philosophers. • \scetic ideals are, 
according to Nietzsche, the very precondition of philosophers leading their lives as 
philosophers. The reason for this is that the 'inactive, brooding, unwadike nature of 
colltemplative men long surrounded them \\;;th a profound mistrustfulness' (GM, III: 
10). In ages dominated by the active and warlike elements of society, those who 
represented the opposite were viewed with a profound distrust and the on),- wa,' to dispel 
this, according to Nietzsche, was to induce in others a 'jiar of oneself (eM, Ill: 10). 
This was, in turn, achieved by retreating from society and taking on the trappings of 
hermits and spiri tual types. Philosophers, in the absence of other options, disguised 
memseh-es using the 'preJ!ioIlJfy e.rtablhbed types of the contemplau\-e man - priest, 
sorcerer, soothsayer, and in any case a religious type - in order to be able to ().:iJt at all 
(eM, III: 10). Thus ascetic ideals provided philosophers with a (dis)guise in which to 
present then1selves to the \vorld so as to avoid persecution and distraction. Philosophers 
put on the ascetic ideal as an acceptable outer garment to hide, and allow them to 
continue wearing, their distrusted philosophical robes underneath. The 'adoption' of the 
ascetic ideal by philosophers is purely pragmatic, and thus carries no inherent meaning. 
They never adopt It because of self-loathing and an abhorrence of their natures. 
·e hlnr: Cri/11m ~t}/ldg(H/m/, :~ 1-5. 
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The crux of the ans\ver to the question of the meaning of the ascetic ideal is its meaning 
for the 'ascetic priest' (CM, III: 11). This is because his 'rigbt to exist stands or falls with 
that ideal' (CM, III: 11). It is the ascetic priest that both creates and disseminates ascetic 
ideals, which in turn justify, in a circular fashion , his yery existence. The ascetic ideal is 
founded on the priest's valuation of our life: 'he juxtaposes it (along with what pertains 
to it: Hnature", "world", the whole sphere of becoming and transitoriness) with a quite 
different mode of existence which it opposes and excludes, Hllless it rurn against itself, 
dell)' itself (CM, Ill: 11). The ascetic ideal rests on a metaphysic of the otherworldly. 
Its focus, rather than being on the world and on life as experienced, is on a posited other 
world, an afterlife, which one may attain if one follows its rules in this life. GiYen this 
metaphysic, life as it is experienced is treated as 'a mistake that is put righ t by deeds' 
(CM, III: 11). The ascetic ideal urges us to put right thi s mistake by acting in accordance 
with its slogans of pm'ert)', humility and chastity. In fact, it holds that 'we ollgbt to put [It] 
right' (C ~1, III: 11). Thus, the ascetic ideal is a normative ideal. It is the form that this 
normati"it\' takes that renders the ideal problematic. The ascetic priest 'demond, that one 
go along with him ... he compels acceptance of bls evaluation of exi stence' (CM, III: 11 ). 
The narure of the normativit\' of the ascetic ideal is thus of a piece with that of the 
normati"e theories discussed in section 1 of Chapter 1. The ascetic ideal posits itself as 
being both impersonal and impartial- the lives of all agents are 'mistakes' to be 'put tight 
by deeds', and the manner in which all agents can do so is by living according to the 
ascetic ideal - and thus as being universal. 
In section 1 of Chapter 1 we sa\v that this sort of universality is appropriate to n10rality, 
or ethics narrowly construed, but not to ethics in the broad sense. However, if morality 
tries to usurp the place of ethics, its claims to universality become problematic. Thus, if 
the ascetic ideal is an ethical, and not a moral ideal, then it cannot help itself to the 
universality it desires. This is because when we attempt to answer the moral question 
'\\'hat ought I to do" we aim at making prescriptions that will be both impersonal and 
impartial, and thus unlversal. On the other hand, when we attempt to answer the ethical 
question 'How ought I to live?' we are attempting to giye an answer with reference to a 
particular agent, no t to agents in general. Given that agents are particular, there can be no 
one uni\~ersal answer to the question. It \vill be seen that considerations of impersonality 
and impartiality are incapable of subsuming the ethical realm. It is for this reason that 
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the ascctic ideal's claims to uni\'crsality are problematic. The ascetic ideal is 
fundamen tally an ethical, not a moral ideal. It gives directiYes not only about action, but 
about other aspects of life, such as what an agent's relation to himself should be, what 
metaphysic he should adopt and what beliefs he should hold. G iven that the ascetic ideal 
acruall~' aims at ans\vering the broader question (How ough t J to live?', rather than the 
narrow question "'·hat ought I (Q do?', universality is inappropriate to it. Because the 
ascetic ideal is an ethical ideal masquerading as a moral one, it is a problematic ideal. 
The metaphysic of the otherworldly that appears to ground the ascetic ideal creates a 
problem - what if this metaphysic is correct? If it is, then the ideal , along with its claims 
to uni,'ersality, is rendered unproblelnatic. \\lhile it is clear that Nietzsche views the 
ascetic ideal's metaphysic as obviously false, his reason for its rejection can be explained 
in terms of the nature of a belief in this metaphysic, rather than the content of the 
metaphYSic itself, This will become clear if we examine the source of the ideal for the 
priests, their real motivation for preaching it, and its meaning for 'the majority of 
mortals'. 
In order for the priests to achieve their 'maximal feeling of power', they must place 
the.mseh·es in a position of authority over the 'majority of mortal s'. This is achieved 
through the preaching and enforcing of the ascetic ideal. The priests demand d,at people 
accept both their valuation of the world and life (with its underlying otherworldI\' 
metaphysic) and their lifestyle (built around the three central values of poverty, chastity 
and humili tv), It would be fair to ask why the majority of people would accept this, given 
that the priests' \'aluation and their lifestYle are in many senses antithetical ro human 
nature . 
.'\n understanding of why people accept and adhere to the ascetic ideal relies on an 
understanding of the priests' motivation in preaching the ideal and the people's 
motivation in accepting it The priests' mou\'ation for preaching the ideal is driyen by 
what Nietzsche terms 'resselltimml'. Ressentiment is a psychological state that Nietzsche 
describes in large part in the first essay of the Genealogy, In this essay he describes two 
distinct character types - the nobles (also referred to as the masters) and the sl,,'es, 
\\'ithin the noble class, there are two groups - the knights and the priests . The 
(physically 'weak' and 'unhealth\" (GM I: 6)) priests are defeated by the (physically 
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stronger and healthier) knights, who assume the position of political supenorlty. This 
creates in the priests 'a peryasive sense of impotence' (Reginster:. 286). 
There are three i"ues raised by Reginster that arc worth noting at this point. (i) The 
salience of physical strength (as possessed by the knights) and weakness (og possessed by 
the priests) is 'a purely contingent aspect' (Reginster, 286) of Nietzsche's account. The 
link between the priests' physical weakness and their feeling of impotence holds pureII' 
because the,' hold this weakness responsible for their loss of political power - it is the 
loss of power, and not the lack of physical prowess, which is actually importan t. (ii) The 
feeling of impotence is not a passing state of mind, but becomes 'an essential feature of 
[the priestsl self-assessment' (Reginster, 286). This leads to the priests viewing 
themselves as 'irremediably weak' (Reginster, 286), having tried everything to regain 
political power and failed. (iii) The priests refuse to accept their impotence, and their 
desire to regain political power persists. 
Nietzsche characterises re.rselltil7lellt as a condition of 'repressed vengefulness' (Glvl 1: 7) 
'\vhich grows out of three major factors: 
1. The agen t \vhom Nietzsche terms the 'man of n:s.r(lIti1JJCIlf (in this case, the priest) 
desires and \'alues a particular kind of life (in this case, that of political 
superiority). 
2. Inhibited by impotence, the priest recognises his 'complete inability' (Reginster, 
287) to fulfil his aspiration to this life. 
3. The priest retains his 'lust to rule' (GM I: 6). In other words, he retains his 
commitment to his original values and refuses to accept his inability to realise 
them. 
These three factors create a 'tension between his desire to live the life he values and his 
belief that he is unable to do so' (Reginster, 287). Out of this tension grows the priest's 
preaching and enforcing of the ascetic ideal. In order to achie,'e a feeling of power, he 
must place himself at the head of the rest of humanity, 'guiding' them in accordance with 
the priestly ascetic ideal. 
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The 'majority of mortals' are drawn to the ascetic ideal for one simple reason: human 
eXlstence is characterised by suffering. The causes of this suffering are many and 
~:; 
"arlOuS , and it takes many forms, both physiological and psychological. Nietzsche 
holds that 'for the \past majority, sJ(ffering is the basic, continuing fact about their liyes' 
(Leiter, 257). GiYen the sortS of creatures that we are and the ways that we lead our lives, 
suffering is inescapable. In and of itself, howev"er, this need not necessarily be a 
problem. In fact, as Nietzsche comments, '[mJan, the bravest of animals and the one 
Illost accustomed to suffering, does 1101 repudiate suffering as such; he desires it, he even 
seeks it out' (eM, III: ~8) . The problem is not that there is suffering, but that there is no 
answer to the more pressing 'crying question, "wh), do I suffer'''' (eM, III: ~8). 
IIfeaningless suffering is unacceptable to humanity. Man will endure suffering of many 
kinds, proyided that there is some meaning to be attached to it. It is because of this that 
the ascetic priest and his ideal can gain a grip on the 'majority of mortals'. What the 
ascetic ideal proyides is a meaning for the suffering that characterises human life in 
general. 
The fonm that the meaning of suffering must take in order to be effective is driven by the 
rtlssenti!J1eJll of the majority. Experiencing suffering as a constant part of their lives, they 
seek someone to blame, someone against " ... hom to take revenge for their suffering. This 
is because 'the discharge of their r(Jsmlilllenl would numb their suffering, but ressenlimen! can 
only be discharged when it has an object' (Leiter, ~58) . The priests provide the rest of 
humanity with a means to alleviate their suffering. There are two methods whereby they 
do this. The first Nietzsche terms 'innocent ' (GM, III: 19). These include 'the general 
muting of the feeling of life, mechanical aco"iry, the petty pleasure, aboye all "love of 
one's neighbour", herd organisation' (eM, III: 19). These methods either serve to make 
the individual's suffering less present through immersion in e.g. labour, or to make the 
individual's suffering seem less seyere by comparison to his peers. The second method is 
what Nietzsche terms 'guilty' (eM, III: 19). It is this method that playS on the need for 
an 'imaginan' reyenge' (eM, I: 10) that is brought about by mJelllllmlll. The priest 
provides the sufferer \\~th someone to blame for his suffering. As Nietzsche puts it, the 
priest says to the sufferer '''Quite so, my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but 
you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it - ),011 alollf are 10 blame for 
),Ollrself''' (eM, III: 15). 'TIm s the direction of the sufferer's m.rclllimwl is re" ersed -
H These include physict\l causes, menral an).,ruish and societal pre%U[cs. 
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instead of being directed outward at a \.\oished for culprit, it is now directed inward at the 
sufferer. 
\X'hat is problematic here is the psychological operation of rrsJelltimellt. ..:\ccording to 
Bernard Reginster, ressentiment 'generates a particular relation between an agent and his 
,'alues' (Rcginster, 301). This relation is a self-deceiving one, which, according to 
Reginster, 'corrupts or dis-integrates the self (Reginster, 301). The reason that 
ressentifnl'lll operates as self-decep tion is that it puts the agent in a posicion in which the 
yalues that he embraces are embraced for reasons that the agent obscures from himself. 
In the case of the priests, the embracing of tbe ascetic ideal is actually done because of a 
desire to regain political supremacy. In the case of the 'majority of mortals', the ascetic 
ideal is embraced to provide relief from suffering. However, in embracing the ideal, they 
become self-decei,'ed. This is because the ideal in fact does nothing to treat the causes 
of the suffering, but at best appears to treat (but in actuality does not) the S\'mptoms, 
thereby making the causes opaque to the sufferer. If the sufferer beliens himself to be 
the cause of his own suffering, then there is no need to look to deal with the actual 
physical, psychological and social causes of his suffering (of wbich the ascetic ideal itself 
may very well be one). 
\,:e are now able to see a way of dealing with the ascetic ideal's metaphysic. The 
metaphysic that supposedly grounds the ideal is in fact the last link in the chain . It is the 
reSSel/limen! of the priests that generates the ideal. Ha\·jng generated the ideal, the need for 
some justification and basis for the ideal arises. Thus the metaphysic is developed. The 
ascetic ideal is based on a self-deception, a lie, which would, \\'ere it true, make the ideal 
universaL Thus the appearance of universality of the ascetic ideal is generated by the 
(actualh' sel f-deceived) belief of the priests and 'the majority of mortals' in the ideal's 
metaphysic. 
It may be objected at this point that the ascetic ideal is in fact a necessary ideal, as it 
provides 'the majority of mortals' with a mechanism for coping with the world. 
'[HJuman kind/Cannot bear too much reality''', especially when that reality is as 
unpleasant as that suffering will be the constant factor of one's life. Bas yan Fraassen 
argues that 'the truth, the real state of fallen hUlnanit)', is unbearable' (Van Fraassen, 
4. T. S. Eliot. 'Burnt ~()rt()t1 ' in Col.'Mtd Pot1lJ1 1909-1961 (Lmdon: Fabt:r and Fabt:r:, 1974). 
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I ·H ) .. -ind, if the truth is unbearable, 'it is not possible to he while facing it' (\'an 
Fraassen, 141). Thus, self-deception about the terrible truth of the world is necessary to 
our ~u[\·ival. This way of looking at th e problem would be attractive if there were no 
alternative. Nietzsche claims that the ascetic ideal (and concomitant self-deception) 
fl ourished only in the absence of an alternative ideal. However, N ietzsche claims to have 
provided such a counter-ideal in Tblls Spoke Zaralbllslra. I t is to a discussion of this ideal, 
the ideal of au thenticity, that I now turn. 
4. Zarathustra and the counter-ideal 
In essence, in pro"iding a counter-ideal, what Nietzsche offers us is an alternauyc 
method of dealing with the terrible truth of the world, that suffering will be a constant 
part of our reality. Instead of denying and hiding this truth from ourseh·es, we are urged 
to accept and embrace it. In this section I shal l discuss the means through which 
Nietzsche urges us to do so (th e ideal of authenticity). I shall do this by drawing mainly 
on the account of authenticity presented in Thus Spokt! Zara/bus/ra, as it is this \vark that 
N ietzsche explicith· identifies as providing the counter-ideal to the ascetic ideal. 
It is important to note before we begin that N ietzsche does not explicitly use the word 
'authentici ty' in his work. ,-\ccording to Jacob Golomb, 'it is possible to locate its origin 
in his recurrent distinctions between Il7abrb,il (tru th) and 117abrbaftigk,i/ (truthfulness), 
(Golomb, 68). Nietzsche believes that there exists no necessary link between th e truth 
and truthfulness. His aversion to notions of absolute or non-perspectival truth~5 does 
not, however, extend to notions of truthfulness. Thus, he could admire ph ilosophers like 
Schopenhauer for an aspect of their characters (their truthfulness) whilst rejecting their 
doctrines as false. The no tion of truthfulness in N ietzsche 'is virtually a synonym of the 
Heideggerian term eigeJl tlidJ and of what in the later existentialist literature is called 
olllb",lii (Golomb, 68). 
In Tbe Ct?)' Sdmfe, Nietzsche puts forward one of the fundamental bases for his 
philosoph\". This is the concep t of 'complete immanence' (Golomb, 68). He declares 
that 'God is dead' (CS: 108,125) - no longer do we h2\"e recourse to the transcendental 
or supernatural as a justification or excuse for ourselves. Thus we must 'begin to 
H St!t! t!.g. c.\!, II I: 12.24-2'"'. 
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"aturali~e humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature' (GS: 109). In 
other words, '[t]ranscendental en tities or supra-natural powers do not exist; there is no 
"pure reason", no other world, no domain different from or superior to OUI own' 
(Golomb, 68). \Ye can refine Golomb's statement in the following way: \Ve hayo 110 good 
n:aJOIl to bdiel!t' that transcendental entities, supra-natural powers, "pure reason" or the 
other world e.xist. In other words, any belief in such a metaphysic would be a motiY3ted 
belief, grounded by non-epistcn1ic reasons. In the case of the priests, the metaphysic is 
believed because it appears to justify their ideal as universal and thus allows them to 
discharge their reJJentiment. In the case of 'the majority of mortals', it is believed because 
it gi"es some sort of meaning to their otherwise meaningless suffering. They belie,-e the 
Inetaphysic, although they are not gh~en any good epistelnic reasons for doing so. Thus, 
if we are to be responsible belieyers, we ought not to accept such a metaphysic. Given 
this, we are placed in a position of responsibility for ourselves, since it is now up to us to 
create ourselves - 'one must adopt for oneself the God-like role of being the originator 
of truth and of one's own self' (Golomb, 68). If we are to do this in a spirit of 
truthfulness, we must 'accept life in all its harshness and its complete irrunanency' 
(Golomb, 68). It is precisell' this that the ascetic ideal prevents us from doing. It 
provides us \\o;th a means to conceal or temper the harshness we experience in the world 
by refusing to accept the complete immanence of the world. It does this by providing us 
with recourse to a metaphysic of the otherworldl\". TIlls pro,·ides a wal' out of being 'the 
originator of truth and of one's own self'. If there is something otherworldly or 
transcendental to which we can appeal (e.g. God, the afterlife) then we are absolved of 
ultimate responsibili ty for ourse]'·es and able to escape the terrible truth of this world bl' 
posi ting a more palatable truth about the supposed next world. This places the 
adherents of the ascetic ideal in a self-deceived position. Nietzsche's counter-ideal 
advocates an acceptance of the terrible truth of the world and provides us with a means 
of dealing with it in a manner that is not self-deceived"'. 
Golomb suggests that one might discern two models of authenticity in Nietzsche's work. 
The Erst of these is the 'biological metaphor of a plant actualizing the potential of the 
seed' (Golomb, 69). This is an image that Nietzsche uses on a number of occasions, not 
only with reference to authenticity. For example, he describes society as a 'tree' that 'at 
last brings forth fruit' in the form of the 'sOIJtreigll Illdillidllo! (GM, II : 2). This way of 
·H. It i:; jntt!n~:;ting to nott! that Rt!wn:;ter :;uAAe~t~ truthfulnt:::;~, in the form of what he terms 'integrity' as an 
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looking at authenticity is summed up by the subtitle of E~w Homo: 'How One Becomes 
\\'hat One !>'. I\ccording to this model, each agent has a particular potential that must 
be realised through his life in order for him to be authentic. The second model is that 
described by the 'metaphor of art and artistic creation' (Golomb, 69). On this model, the 
agent 'freely shapes his self as a work of art' (Golomb, 69). It is this type of active self-
shaping that can act as. an antidote to the passivity of the ascetic ideal. In order for such 
self-shaping to take place, we must have self-knowledge, so that we can 'distinguish what 
we can change in ourselves and in the external circumstances that have shaped us; we 
must realize what we have to accept as incyitable, and mus.t do so in the heroic manner 
of amor fat/-' (G olomb, 69). If we have sufficient self-knowledge, we will be able to 
accept and deal with th e terrible truth of the world, y,i thout needing the ascetic ideal as a 
crutch to our exis tence. 
I-Iaving sufficient self-knowledge in this case means 'knowing one's own instinctual 
desires, being aware o f one's hidden wishes and of one's genuine .. character. _\t the 
same time it recommends coming to terms and living with them in a well-functioning 
and authentic manner' (Golomb, 70-71). \X'hat is recommended is an effort to gain self-
knowledge of the type that will allow one to bring one's passions and one's reason into 
harmony. The effort towards self-knowledge that is needed here is what Volker 
Gerhardt terms 'self-relaxatio/1' (Gerhardt, 287). As I understand it, self-relaxation is a 
mm-ing away from focusing solely on the intentions that lie behind actions, and allowing 
oneself to take other factors (such as those of the type that Sartre would term 'facticit,,') 
seriously as an agent. By doing this one does not fall into the trap of overemphasising 
transcendence and ignoring the absolute immanence of the world. 
The model of authenticity that Nietzsche prm-ides us with as a solution to the problem 
of the ascetic ideal without leaving us in the unacceptable position of our suffering being 
completely tneaningless is that of eternal return·H1 . The idea of eternal return is one that 
has often baffled commentators on his work. This 'mad myth'" is baffling to them, I 
contend, due to a particular interpretation of the idea to which they subscribe. Following 
Nehamas' interpretation up to a point, I propose an alternative interpretation, which no t 
antidote t() rtumlilJlu:: (Re~instt:[, 198-301). 
~ ~ uwt! of fatl;!, 
~" _-\lso tcrmeu 'eternal rt:curn:nct:' by some tram!ators and commellEarors. 
~<) ~Wan Kumlera, Tb, Unbearable LighllfJJ q( Beillg, P 3 (Lomhm: Faber & Faber, 1999). 
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only gets rid of the bafflement, but also demonstrates how TbllJ Spok, Zaratimstra 
provides the requisite coun rer-ideal to the ascetic ideal. 
The idea of eternal return is identified b,' Nietzsche as '[t]he fundamental conception of 
[ZaratlmJt""] ... [the] highest affirmation of all that is attainable' (EH, II, Z: 1). It is 'most 
common)" construed as a cosmological h'-pothesis' (Nehamas, 119). In Nehamas' terms: 
'eyen'thing that has already happened in the universe, and even·thing that is happening 
right now, and everything that will happen in the future, has alread,' happened, and will 
happen again, preceded and followed by exactly the same events in exactly the same 
order, infinitely many times' (Nehamas, 119). Or, to put it a little more succinctly, 
'cyerythlng recurs as we once experienced it, and that recurrence itself recurs ad 
infinitum ~ (K.undera, 3). Those who hold this vicw:;u do so because of a narrow 
interpretation of particular mentions made by Nietzsche of the idea. For example, in (Of 
the Vision and the Riddle' (Z, III: 2), Zarathustra, in an attempt to defeat the Spirit of 
Gravity (a lame-footed dwarf he has been carn~ng up the mountain on his back), says: 
Behold this gateway, dwarf] ... It has two aspects. Two paths 
come together here: no one has ever reached their end. This 
lane behind us: it goes on for eternity. _\nd that long lane 
ahead of us - that is another eternity ... [I]t is here at this 
gateway that they come rogether. The name of the gateway is 
written above it: "Moment", .. From this gateway i\ioment a 
long, eternal lane runs back: an eternity lies behind us. Must 
not all things that call run haye already run along this lane' Must 
not all things that C(/" happen bal)' already happened ... ? 
In trus passage it does seem that what Zarathustra is talking about is some form of 
cosmology. Nehama~ suggests two ways in which we might view the idea of eternal 
return as a cosmological hypothesis. Either it is the 'ullconditional assotioll of a cosmology': 
'My life will recur in exactly identical fashion' or it is the 'co"ditiollol osserlioll of a 
cosmolog)~: 'My life mO)' recur in exactly identical fashion'. However both of these 
suggestions are problematic, for three reasons. Fin,tly, such a cosmology, although it 
may haye been corruTIon in a number of ancient ci\·ilisations, seems to be a highly 
improbable, and possibly even implausible one. Even if we were to ignore this, however, 
it would still be problematic. The second reason for this is that Nietzsche offers us onl\' 
two options with respect to our reaction [Q trus idea. In section 341 of The Gqy Sde!1(e, 
"-I E.g. :\rehut Danro . . ,\"itl::;/,1J1 tJ.r Phi/osop/Ill" ~t:\\" York: ~lacmiUan, 1965); '(·alter Kaufmann, .,\-id~s. be: 
Pbilosoph!r. PydJ%gisl. AfltidJ liJ"1 ~e\V York: \-intage, 1968); Bernd )'la!-,'Uu::, <~ie (z::chc\ £ltloali::rlc 
Countt:rmyeh', & 1I!'111 q{.HIIOp/!)'Jirs, 26 (1973) pp 604-616 . 
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N ietzsche asks his reader to imagine that in 'your loneliest loneliness' a demon comes to 
you and suggests the notion of eternal return. He then asks: '\\'ould rou not throw 
yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you 
once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: "You are 
a god, and never have I heard anything more divine".' (GS, 341). Thus we may react 
either \-vith absolute anguish or absolute joy. Nietzsche does not give us the option of 
reacting with 'indifference' (Nehamas, 125) to the question. It would seem that, if the 
question \vere about a cosmological hypothesis, then one could be indifferent in at least 
(wo ways: either to the 'actllol fact of recurrence' or to the 'psychological consequences of 
the possibility of the recurrence of one's life' (Neharnas, 125-126). The fact that 
Nietzsche does not offer us these options creates doubt as to whether what he had in 
mind was a cosmological hypothesis . The third reason for not vie\ving eternal return as a 
cosmological hypothesis has to do ,,~th the nature of cosmology". Cosmology, in the 
sense that Nehamas uses itS2 is properly construed as a branch of metaphysics. N ietzsche 
was notoriously sceptical about the idea of metaphvsical 'truths'. As I argued above with 
respect to the metaphysic of the ascetic ideal, metaph\'sical ideas are not the sort of 
things for which we can have proper epistemic reasons to believe. Nehamas notes that 
the cosmological conception of eternal return is 'essentially a theory for which no 
empirical evidence can be given' (Nehamas, 120). In the absence of good reason to 
believe in transcendental justifications for theories, it is precisely such empirical evidence 
that we \vould require in order to epistemically justify a belief in eternal return as a 
cosmological hypothesis. 
Zarathustra's response to his animals when they attempt to attribute the cosmological 
hypoth esis to him provides us with further evidence that eternal return is not to be 
interpreted in this \.vay, In 'The Conyalescent', Zarathustra's animals declare him to be 
'tbe lead"r of elernal mllrr",,.e' (Z, III: 13: 2) . They state his position as being 'that all things 
recur eternally and \ve ourselves with them, and that \ve haye already existed an infinite 
number of times and all things with us' (Z, III: 13: 2). Zarathustra's response to their 
interpretation is to call them 'buffoons and barrel-organs' that have made 'a hurdy-gurdv 
song' (2, HI: 13: 2) out of his teachings. The fact that Nietzsche included this passage 
provides us both \V';th a possible interpretation of eternal return (the cosmological 
_, 1 .\n illuminating discus:;ion on rhi:; subject with Francis \, 'illiam:;on was of great assistance In my 
formulation of tbi:; problem. 
'i~ .·\s oppo:;ed to the sense in which it might be used by a physicist, for example. 
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hypothesis) and with a rejection of it. This prm-ides us with e,-idence that this is not the 
interpretation that Nietzsche had in mind for the ideal of eternal rerurn. 
If eternal return is not to be interpreted as a cosmological hypothesis, then another 
interpretation must be found. Nehamas suggests what he terms a psychological 
interpretation. This involves the 'assertion of a t"ollditiona/: 'If my life were to recur, it 
would recur in exactly identical fashion' (Nehamas, 127). This interpretation has 
'nothing' to do \vith physics or the truth of the cosmological hypothesis, 'or even its 
coherence' (Nehamas, 127). Thus, Nehamas holds that what Nietzsche is interested in is 
the conditional hypothesis that, in the event of my (or any other) life recurring, it would 
recur in like fashion. \\'hilst this is far less problematic than the cosmological hypothesis, 
I believe that it fails to capture the true meaning of eternal return, and leaves us without a 
strong enough counter-ideal to the ascetic ideal. 
1\"an SoIl argues that Nietzsche is not interested in the question of whether or not a life 
will, or e,-cn can, recur infinitely in like f.shion. \'>;'h.t he is .ctu.ll" interested in is the 
atlitlld, that one must have with respect to oneself 10 order to react Joyfully to the 
demon's question in GS 341 (Soli, 323). This notion of one's attitude to oneself is key to 
both the ascetic ideal and eternal return. In the case of the ascetic ideal, it is demanded 
that one's attitude to oneself be one of self-loathing and abhorrence of one's base nature 
and fleshly desires. Wbat then is the attitude that is necessary to make eternal return an 
ideal to which one can respond with JOY rather than despair? 
The answer to this question is to be found in 'Of Redemption' (Z, II: 20). In this 
section, Zarathustra discusses his conception of redemption as follo\vs : 
To redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all 
"It was" into "thus I willed it" - that alone I should call 
redemption ... '\villing liberates; but what is it that puts even 
the liberator in fetters? "I twas" - that is the name of the 
will's gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. Power-
less against what has been done, he is an angry spectator of all 
that is past. The will cannot wi ll backwards; and that he cannot 
break time and rime's CO\'ewusness, that is the will's loneliest 
melancholy (Z, II: 20/,. 
~. Tht: yuotaooll ht:re is from the Kaufmann translacion (in The Por/abl/! .Yiet:;'fCb" ~e\ .... YOLk: \ 'iking, 1954). 
as iT makrs drar the notion of willing- throughout. 
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This passage reveals the key to how we are to view eternal return, and to how it forms a 
suitable counter-ideal to the ascetic ideal. Eternal return is to be \'iewed as an attitude to 
oneself and one's life such that one is able to will that an~' moment in that life could recur 
eternally. 
Nehamas identifies two problems \\lith this yiew of eternal return, which I shall discuss 
before explaining how, despite his objections, this proyides an antidote to the ascetic 
ideal and how it is that we could come to have such an attitude towards ourselves . 
Nehamas' problems are as follows. Firstly, 'our power to control our future is not as 
absolute as Zarathustra sometimes suggests, since at any time our possibilities are limited 
by our past and our present' (Nehamas, 131). This is, howe,"er, perfecrly consistent with 
the interpretation J outlined abo,·e. In order to live one's life in such a way that one is 
sufficiently at peace with it to be able to will its eternal return, one does not have to have 
absolute control oyer one's future. As I argued earlier, living an authentic life means, that 
we must have self-knowledge and, in Golomb's words that we must be able to 
'distinguish what we can change in ourselves and in the external circumstances that have 
shaped us; we must realize what we have to accept as inevitable, and must do so in the 
heroic manner of omorjolt' (Golomb, 69). \Ve are never in complete control of our 
situation , but it is our situation that, although it constrains action, is the very condition of 
action. It is not our complete control over past, present or future that is important, but 
our attitude to them. Nehamas' second problem is that 'our past is now given to us; it 
consists of events which have already occurred, and oyer which we have no longer any 
control' (Nehamas, 131). Once again, this problem arises from a misreading of what is 
necessary to eternal return. \Ve do not need to be able to change the past in the sense of 
being able to go back and undo or redo actions or eyents that we feel to be worthy of 
regret or shame. \,"hat we do need to be able to change is our attitude to and our 
interpretation of such actions or e,"ents, as part of the formation of a (hope full," better) 
selt'. Nehamas in fact provides the answer to his own objection: '[wJ hat is then changed 
is not the past, but its sigllificallce' (Nehamas, 132, my emphasis). Thus it is best that one 
live one's life in such a way that one is suitably at peace \vith it that one could will its 
eternal return . 
. ~~ This is not, as I shall arl-,'Ut! in Chaprer 3. an eXCuse for the sort of beha\-iour \Ve would vit\\- as immoral. 
Thtrt are limits set' on our actions by considtrauons of others anu our rdations to and with thtm. 
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This notion of eternal return pro\Oides an antidote to the ascetic ideal in two ways. 
Firstly, it provides us with a different means of valuing and gi,oing meaning to our 
suffering. Instcad of taking our suffering to be our own fault for failing to Ii,'e up to the 
ascetic ideal, we must yiew it instead as part of our de'°elopmenr. Suffering is thus not 
something for which a culprit needs to be sought in order to discharge our ressentimcllt, 
but something that we must accept as part of our lives. Instead of engaging in 
reJselltimcJlt-ciriven self-deception, we must engage in its antithesis, self-creation . 
Secondly, eternal return provides a solution to the problcm of the will to nothingness 
with which Nietzsche ends 011 th, Gen,a/o!!)' of Morals. Nietzsche states that 'man would 
ra ther will nothingness than not will' (GM, III: 28). :\dherence to the ascetic ideal 
amounts to willing nothingncss, as the ideal is lifc-den)~ng and grounded in the 
otherworldly. Eternal return prm'ides us with something to will other than nothingness. 
Rather than will nothingness, we should will that any moment of our lives could recur 
infinitely. This willing is the reycrsc of a \\~ll to nothingness, as it is firmly grounded in 
this world and how we li,oe our lives in it, allowing us no recourse to the otherworldly 
and making us completely responsible for ourselves. 
This may all seem like a very onerous demand. It seems, as Nehamas says, that we are 
not sufficientl)' in control to be ablc to take such a gra\'e responsibilit\, on our shoulders, 
It is presumably for this reason that Nietzsche cntitled the section in which the demon's 
guestion is raised 'The heaviest weight' (GS, 341). In order for us to be able to cam' this 
weight, we need self-knowledge. Nietzsche was obviously aware of 'how intense, and 
how very painful a self-examination is necessary before the question can be answered' 
(Nehamas, 135), as he describes the occasion of the demons' question as one's 'loneliest 
loneliness' (GS, 341), 'when presumabh' one would be most likely to be honest with 
oneself' (Nchamas , 135). 
The crucial component of this account of authcnticit\, is that of self-knowledge. .-\ 
rigorous and in tense self-knowledge is necessary if we are to li\+e authentically In 
accordance with the ideal of eternal return. In aU the mentions made so far about self-
knowledgc, its acguisition has bcen linked with painstaking self-examination in one's 
'loneliest loneliness'. This seems to suggest that authenticity is a purely solitary pursuit. 
Howeycr, ,oiewing authenticity in this way fails to capture a very important aspect of our 
acquisition of self-knowledge, that of the role played by other agents, In the next chapter 
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I discuss this ro le, and its significance in preventing the ideal of authenticity from 
becoming an ideal that is prelnised purely on an indi':,:idual 's solitary self-eyaluation. 
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Chapter 3 
A model of self-knowledge 
Self-knowledge, as we haye seen in section 4 of Chapter 2, is the crucial component of 
the ideal o f authenticity presented to us by N ietzsche in his theory of eternal return. 
Nietzsche draws his readers' attention to the importance of self-knowledge on numerous 
occasions. So important is the notion of self-knowledge that he begins Oil/he Genealogy of 
i.~1o,.a/s with the statement that '[w]e are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge' 
(GM, P: 1). He goes on to state that in fact this should not surprise us: we are unknown 
to ourselves because '[w]e have never sought ourselves' (GM, P: 1). If we h,,'e neyer 
sought ourseh'es, made a real attempt at self-knowledge, then 'how could it eYer happen 
that we should find ourselves?' (GM, P: 1). Haying said this, however, Nietzsche does 
not provide us with explicit guidelines as to how to go about seeking ourselves. 
In this chapter I aim to supplement Nietzsche's account of authenticity by providing a 
model of self-knowledge that will give us a means to finding the self-knowledge that we 
need to live authentically according to the ideal of eternal return and that will pro,'ide a 
signifi cant role to others in the acquisition of such self-knowledge. In section 1, I discus 
the idea that self-knowledge is in fact more than a merel\' individual pursuit, drawing on 
Dav'id Jopling's account of self-knowledge as a dialogic process. I vie\\' Jopling's account 
as haying twO components, each of which need more support than Jopling's arguments 
provide. In section 2, I provide a model of dialogue that is strong enough to support a 
dialogic ,·iew o f self-knowledge, drawing on and adding my own modifications to Roben 
Brandom)~ theory of assertion. Section 3 provides an account of what sort of 
relationship I ought to have to the other in such a dialogue, using LC\'inas' critique of 
Merleau-Ponty's account o f intersubjecuvity. In section 4 I revisit the ideal o f eternal 
rerum , demonstrating how the account of self-knowledge I have given both proyides an 
adequate framework for self-knowledge acquisition of the requisite type, and how this 
model of self-knowledge tempers the "iew that authenticity is a lonely indi,'idual pursuit. 
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1. Self-knowledge as a dialogic encounter 
:\s I commented at the end of the preyious chapter, all the mentions that have thus far 
been made of self-knowledge have treated it as a solitary process, 'a struggle of the self 
with itself (Jopling, 135). Self-knowledge and its acquisition have been treated (or rather, 
tacitly assumed to be) projects 'o[the self, 0' the self, andfor the self Gopling, 135). No 
reference has yet been made to the fact that there is an important element of self-
knowledge and the acquisition thereof that is intersubjective. In this section I provide a 
defence of why this is so and, drawing largely on Jopling's account, provide an account 
of how the inter subjective aspect of self-knowledge and self-knowledge acquisition 
operates. 
It may at first appear perfectly obvious tI,at when one is admonished to know oneself, 
the sole arbiter of this knowledge must be oneself, for after all, who could know one 
better than one knows oneself from the inside, as it were? This appearance is not 
altogether implausible, and in fact, may seem rather attracuvc. This vie\v of self-
knowledge and self-knowledge acquisition may be termed the individualist view. It is 
characterised by three main theses. Firstly, '[n]o-one has better access to the bulk of 
rele\~ant information about my desires, beliefs and traits of character than I do, (/)(11 if there 
are sam, tmtbs abollt m, tbat otbm s" more ricarD' tball J diS' Gopling, 136, my emphasis). 
This is not to be construed as a statement about ha\~ing priyileged access to one's own 
mental states, but rather as an acknowledgement chat, as compared to others, one 
'enJoy[s] a privileged starting point' with respect to knowledge of oneself, as one is 
simultaneously (the inquirer and the subject matter upon which the inquiry is directed' 
Gopling, 136). In other words, my position when inquiring about myself is unique, in 
that both the inquiry and its subject matter afe in some sense internal to me. In the case 
of someone else trying to gain knowledge of my self, the inquiry is internal to her, but the 
subject matter is not. Secondly, 'interpersonal perception is often wildly inaccurate' 
Oopling,136). It will readily be allowed by most that one's perception of o thers is easily 
clouded by biases and presuppositions arising from one's relationship with the person in 
question, one's latent prejudices, one's personal agenda etc. The evidence for this is 
easily found 'in those cases where different persons describe me in different ways' 
Gopling, 136). \Yhat the fact that different people mar describe me in (possibly vastly) 
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different WJYS suggests is that there may be a gap between how I am viewed and what is 
actually the case. It seems ha.rd to decide whose account, if any. is the correct one. 
Thirdly, <the information about me to which other persons ha\-e better access than 
myself is not always; immediately relevant for the purposes of addressing the question 
',\\'ho am 1"" G opling, 136). This is a subtle problem, which condenses to the fact that 
mv inquiries aimed at gaining self-knowledge are 'pitched and scaled to my situation and 
needs' Gopling, 136), whereas those of others are not. \\'hat others have to say about 
tne, my character, my beha,"iour will tell me a great deal about ho,v they view me, and 
may help in my inquiries, but will not subsume my self-knowledge. This is because there 
exists a gap between my knowledge of myself from a first-person point of view and 
others' knowledge of me from a third-person point of view. Such third-personal 
knowledge of myself, \~thout further translation ... remains knowledge abollt myself 
Gopling, 137) as opposed to knowledge <if myself. 
Gi,'en these three theses, the individualist view of self-knowledge m,,' appear both 
plausible and attractive. However, it is a distorted view, \XThilsr it may be the case (and I 
believe that it is) that valuable self-knowledge can be gained bl' individual self-
examination and reflection, this does not subsume all that there is to self-knowledge 
acqUlsmon. There are other imponant aspects to the process that must be examined if 
we are to arrive at an accurate picture of self-knowledge acquisition. Jopling motivates 
the need for examining aspects other than the purely individual by identif)~ng five 
reasons why the individualist ,'iew offers us a distorted picture of self-knowledge and 
self-knowledge acquisition. He does not proyide a great deal of argument for these 
reasons, but simply states them as motinting doubt about the validi,,' of the indi,'idualist 
view. I shall state each of Jopling's reasons and then attempt to provide some argument 
for th eir plausibility as reasons for abandoning the individualist view of self-knowledge. 
1. The self is 'too complexly configured to be accessible to a single finite mind inquiring 
into itself by itself Gopling, 137). 
This is a similar criticism to one of the criticisms of sincerity that I made in section 3 
of Chapter 1. The mind is not sufficiently transparent to itself that eyer)'thing about 
me can be clear to me. Certain of my moth-ations, desires, 'v1shes, etc may be (and 
often are) opaque to me. The fact that I can be deceiyed about these aspects of 
~.~ The emphasised pas:;age already beh>1m ro :;how the flaws of the individualist position .. \ discussion of 
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ml'self demonstrates that the self is not as obvioush' knowable to itself as we migh t 
like to belie\·e. It is important to note here that this sort of self-deception need not 
be pathologIcal. I may, despite Irving my best to come to an honest appraisal of 
myself, still be self-deceived about those aspects of mysel f that are opaque to me, or 
to which I do not ha\'e access. This, coupled with the fact that, due to the nature of 
self-deception, I cannot both be self-deceived and attribute self-deception to myself, 
although others can attribute it to me, should lead us to believe that there is an 
important role to be played bl' others in gaining self-knowledge. Further e\'idence 
for this position cOlncs from research concerning moti\"ated beLieving5('. Such 
research reveals that subjects in fact often make mistakes in their self-ascriptions and 
that fai lures of self-knowledge are more prevalent than we at fIrst believe. As I 
discussed in section 3 of Chapter 2, self-deception is an important concept in 
Nietzsche's cri tique both of n:JScntimcJlI and of the ascetic ideal. Precisely what is 
wrong with rfJsentiment and with the ascetic ideal is that they induce in the agent a 
self-deceived state. Thus, if we are to give an account of self-knowledge and its 
acquisition that is to be of use with respect to N ietzsche's ideal of eternal rerurn, we 
need to make sure that it provides a mechanism for avoiding self· deception (as far as 
is possible). 
2. Self-understanding is 'incomplete without an understanding of the social and 
interpersonal conditions influencing the seIrs moral and psychological de\'elopment' 
Oopling, 137). 
This is a fairly uncont.roycrsial claim. There are aspects of the self that are formed 
and reinforced through our interactions with others . Such aspects include our moral 
deyelopment and our abilities to relate to persons other than ourseh·es . tietzsche 
emphasises the large role that our sociality plays in our development, especially in our 
adoption of moral norms and customs. H e devotes a very signifIcant portion of the 
second essal' of 011 1/;, G,mology of Mora/r to this verI' subject. Here he sta tes that 
\vhere society and the morality of custom at last reycal what they hayc simply been 
the means to: we discover that the ripest fruit is the Jowreigll illdividual (GM, II: 2). 
Nietzsche would thus be apt to agree that without a proper understanding of the 
processes invoked in these interpersonal aspects of self, a full self-understanding is 
not possible. 
these flaws foUows the exposition of rhe indh·jdualist line. 
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3. The 'accuracy or inaccurac\' of self-understandings has direct effects on the well-
being of others' Oopling, 137). 
This criticism of the individualist view of self-kno\'.rledge is a rather indirect one. In 
the interests of ha,·ing well functioning societies. we need to have accurate self-
understandings, which, according, to Jopling, require a thicker conception of self-
knowledge than the purely individualist view outlined abO\-e_ \X'e need to attempt to 
make our self-understandings more accurate through the elimination of problems like 
self-deception. Jopling believes that this is only possible within a framework 
invoking appropriate interaction s with other people. 
Of Jopling's reasons for abandoning the individualist view of self-knowledge, this 
strikes me as being the one that is least strongly tied to the acquisition of self-
knowledge. \\hat he claims is that ha\-ing accurate self-understandings has pragmatic 
yalue for the maintenance of successfully functioning communities and SOCleDes, 
because the accuracy or inaccuracy of such understanding directly effects the well-
being of other members thereof. Whilst this may be (and almost certainh- is) the 
case, this is not really a strong criticism of the indiyidualisr view of self-knowledge 
acquisition, as it makes no claims about the necessity of others in gaiJling the self-
knowledge that will suppOrt healthy societies. 
4. Knowing about the intersubjective aspects of the self 'is not possible without actuaU), 
ha\-ing participated in the appropriate kinds of social relations' Oopling, 138). 
This point brings to our attention the fact that, in interacting with others in \vays in 
which 'the effects of others' actions and traits of character upon oneself are clearly 
perceivable' Gepling, 138), we learn about our own behaviour and character traits. 
\X:e can then attelnpt to adapt our behaviour and character traits in ways that either 
bring us in line with those of others or distance us from them, depending on 
approprIateness. Once again, this is a slightly indirect criticism of the indindualist 
\'iew. What Jopling seems to be suggesting here is that, in experiencing the effects 
that flo\v from other people's character traits, I am able to learn about what sorts of 
character traits I ought to (or might want to) cultivate. 
o. Certain truths about the self 'can only be gained through certain kinds of dialogue 
with others' Oopling, 138) . 
. ,(, See, for t!xample, Zi\'a Kunda 'The Cast: for :\[ori,-,ut:d Rt::as()nin~> (Plj'ch%gicnj Blllle!ill, 108: 3, 1990) and 
Shelly Taylor aod Jonathan Brown 'Illusion and \'X'dl-BeinK .\ Social Psychol()~cal Pt:rspecrivl.:: on '\lcnral 
Health (PDyh%~ica/ Blllle:ill, 103: 2. 1988). 
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The sort of di.logue that Jopling has in mind here i, that which he describe, as 
inYoh-ing <feelings of participation, morally reactive attitudes, and mutually 
responsive emotions' G opling, 138). It is this sort of dialogue that is central to his 
account of self-knowledge as dialogic that I discuss below. 
Jopling believes that these five reasons are sufficient to establish the need to look beyond 
the individuali,t view of self-knowledge - ' [TJhese five considerations suggest that the 
means to ,elf-knowledge, and the content of ,elf-knowledge, ha\'e a clear social 
dimension; more specifically, that the,' presuppose standing in appropriate kinds of social 
relationships' Gopling, 138). Jopling believes that the individualist picture is 'captivating 
.. but ... fal,e' Gopling, 137). He believes that all ,elf-knowledge is 'indissolubly tied' 
Oopling, 157) to dialogue. Thus he believes that we must abandon the individualist view 
entirely. As I have already commented, I believe that there are important individual 
aspects to self-knowledge. However, I am in agreement with Jopling that there arc 
important parts of the process of gaining self-knowledge that im'olve other agents. Thus 
I believe that the individualist account should be supplemented \\lith an account that 
takes cognisance of the intersubjective aspects of self-knowledge acquisition. To begin 
this supplementation I outline] opling's account of self-knowledge as dialogic. 
The kinds of social relations that Jopling takes to be 'appropriate' for th e acquisition of 
self-knowledge are a particular type of dialogic relation to the other. Thus Jopling's 
alternatin account to the indi\'idualist view of self-knowledge is one that regards self-
knowledge and its acquisition as a dialogic process. Jopling begins hi s account with a 
discussion of the notion of dialogue. There are many forms of dialogue, 'some 
superficial or m otivated by extrinsic considerations (e.g. controlling the other's opinions, 
or prolonging the conversation for its own sake), and some leading to misunderstanding 
or alienation' Gopling, 152). The type of dialogue that Jopling has in mind as being 
suited to self-knowledge acquisition is what he terms 'refl ective' dialogue Gopling, 152). 
He describes reflective dialogue as being characterised by 'an open-texrured process 
based on the response and address of self and other, through which both interlocutors 
are united by the desire [0 achieve nllltuol alJd truth-trackillg understanding while re.rpectillg 
the moral differences separating them' Oopling, 152, my emphases). The emphasi,ed 
phrases in the above quotation highlight the two i,sues that need to be .ddressed in an 
account of self-knowledge as a dialogic encounter. I ,,"jew these as the two components 
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of Jopling" account - dialogue must (1) lead to 'mutual and truth~tracking' 
understanding and (2) be undertaken whilst respecting the difference between 
interlocutors. However, Jopling does very little to pro\-ide us with adequate mechanisms 
whereby we can success fully achieve these two things. In order to rem edy this, in the 
next two sections I provide the requisite mechanisms that will render the account strong 
enough to support the need for s elf~kno\Vledge brought about b,' the ideal of authenticin' 
presented in section ~ of Chapter 2. Thus, in section 2, J provide an account of how it is 
that interlocutors can reach an understanding that is both mutual and truth-tracking. In 
order to do this, I draw on theory from the philosoph)' of language, In section 3, I 
provide an account of how it is that agents are to relate to each o ther so as to preser,c 
respect in the dialogic process, by using Levinas' critique of ~lerleau-Ponty's account of 
in tersubjecti"i t) .. 
2. Rules of engagement 
Jopling's account of self~knowledge holds that we gain self~knowledge through dialogic 
encounters wjth others, The first criterion for an appropriate (i.e. self~kno\Vledge 
generating) dialogue that he sets out i, that it must generate 'mutual and truth~tracking' 
under"anding. By 'mutual', Jopling mean, that the understanding generated by the 
dialogue must be one that both participants have access to and share. By 'tru th~tracking' 
I take him to mean that such understanding must present the participants in the dialogue 
with an accurate picture of their worlds, including themseh·es. If a proposition tracks the 
truth, it corresponds to something about the world. If my statement that there is a 
cricket nutch being played tomorrow or that you have a generous character is to be 
truth~ tracking, it must in fact be the case that there is a cricket match being played 
tomorrow or that you are, in fact, a generous person. 
If a dialogue of an" tvpe, whether conducive to sel f~knowledge acquisition or not, is to 
take place, there must o f necessity be at least two agents involved. These we may 
designate as the speaker and the hearer. The speaker and the hearer must han sufficient 
commonality in reference points and languageS- that it enables them to potentially reach 
so. \,{'har \'Cirrgenstt:in would fe.rm 'form of lift:' (Lebell~fom/) . St:c PhiloJopbi;a/ Illvestigations (3fd Edition 
Trans. G . E. .\ f. :\oscombt:, Oxfurd: Basil Blackwd l, 1986), ~~ 2 .. n, 242. 
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an understanding. In order for 'mutual and truth-tracking' understanding to be reached 
between interlocutors, meaning must be generated by their encounter. \'X".'ithout the 
generation of meaning, there is no possibility of murual or LIuth-tracking understanding 
occurring. In the event of a meaningless exchanges/!, no understanding can be reached by 
the parties, as there is nothing to be understood. In the section I proyide an account of 
how meaning-generation ma~- take place. I first elucidate Robert Brandom's account of 
assertion in J\1akillg 1t Explicit. I then provide my account of how, from this account of 
assertion, we may generate and account of meanings'), 
Brandom terms this account tht: 'deontic(~ ' scorekeeping model of discursive practice' 
(Brandom, 141), For Brandom, it is 'only because some performances functi on as 
assertions that others deserve to be distinguished as speecb acts' (Brandom, 172). Without 
assertions, other forms of speech acts fail to get off the ground. This is because it is 
from assertions that we generate other speech acts, such as questions. \Xhthout 
assertions, we are unable to Inake inferences to further assertions. ~A.ssertion is thus a 
necessary condition for the designation of any practice as a speech act. 
The 'social practices' which arc responsible for the creation of our 'propositional contents' 
can be understood 'in terms of practices of giving and asking for reasoll! (Brandom, 141). 
These practices together constitute a language game in which the 'fundamental' move is 
'making a claim' (Brandom, 141) or asserting something. \\'hen a performance is treated 
as an assertion, it is treated as 'dle undertaking or acknowledging of a certain kind of 
commitment (Brandom, 142), which in turn entails the idea of '/ltit/emellt. Commitments 
and entitlements are types of social statuses, which are attributed 'according to the 
practical attitudes of society' (Brandom, 142). The types of attitudes that Brandom has 
in mind are those of 'taking or treating as correct' (Brandom, 137). The notion of reason-
giYing, together with the attitude of treating propositions as correct, is fundamental to 
the truth-tracking nature of a dialogue, as we shall see later in this section. These 
attirudes may be described as 'practical' in the sense that they are the actual attirudes 
which pre\'ail in a community and which are implemented in its day-to-day dealings. 
i l! .-\bstllutd~· mc:aningless c:xchanges are hart! to imahrine, but wc might plausibly think of an intcraction in 
which the parti!.!s art.' so far rcmoved from each other in languagt: and rderence point's rhar nelrht:r gains 
an~' meaning from the exchange as an example. 
~~ ~ Iy thanks ttl Dr Da\'id Ryan for his insi)!;hrful C(JITUTIenrs on an earlit:[ "crsion of this section. 
". By this, Brandom means ha,'ing ro do \virh dLloes . _'\s wt: shall sct: in tht: following subsection, ht: terms 
tht:se 'commitments' and 'cntitlements', For furrht:r commt:nt, st:e nOft: 61 on tht: following page. 
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\X'ith in this language game, we keep track of our own and of others' comrnitn1cn ts and 
entitlements. This makes us what Brandom terms 'deonlit sfo rekeepers' (Brandom, 142) . By 
this Brandom means that, when we engage each other in dialogue, we keep track of the 
assertions we make, so as to be able to point out to each other contradictions, lack of 
cyidcnce, and so forth, within QllI assertions. 
Tbe lal1guage game 
OUI social practices arc games in which 'each participant exhibits various deanne 
statuses' which are altered in some way by every 'practically significant performance' 
(Brandom, 166). The practical significance of such performances derives from the ways 
in which they actually change the deontic statuses of the players of the game, who keep 
score by attributing and undertaking such deontic statuses. 
Brandom holds with \'i'ilfrid Sellars' notion a ' "game of gi"ing and asking for reasons" , 
(Brandom, 167). ;\ " ertions are 'in the fundamental case what reasons are asked for, and 
what giving a reason always consists in' (Brandom, 167) . The commitmen t that we 
undertake or attribute by making an assertion can be both something in need of a reason 
and something that can be given as a reason. Only assertional commitments can be both 
these things. This is why Brandom ,·iews assertions as fundamental to the performance 
of speech acts. 
Commitments (Iud Elltitlemellts 
Because discursiye practice is normative, it must inyolve the assessment of moves in the 
language game as correct or inco rrect, or as appropriate or inappropriate. In order to do 
so, we require certain 'pmp!;,I!,! of performance' (Brandom, 1 j 9). It is the institution b,· 
the players of the language game of these proprieties that is 'the ultimate source of 
meanings' (Brandom, 159). In order to 'pick out what is distinctive of discursive norms' 
(Brandom, 159), we must refine the general notion of proptieties by acknowledging 
different "pes of propriety. 
The most fundamental of these types of ptopriety is the notion of tommit"" "t. Being 
committed to something is a deontic status. 'Coordinate' (Brandom, 159) with the 
notion of commitment is that of mlitlement. According to Brandom, commitment and 
entitlement correspond to the morc standardly used notions of obligation and 
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permISSlOn(,1 Commitment and entitlement are not simply defined in terms of one 
another. COlTunitment is not simply the negation of entitlement or vice versa. The 
relation between commitment and entitlement makes clear the idea of i11contpalibi/fiJI, 
Two claims arc incompatible with each other 'if commitment to one precludes 
entitlement to the other' (Brandom, 160). Thus, if one is comnutted to a proposition, p, 
and p and q are incompatible, one is then not entitled to claim that q . 
. 1t1dblltioll and .-1 ckJlow/edgemwt 
Our deontic statuses (commitments and entitlements) arise from 'practical attitudes' 
(Brandom, 161). They do not exist 'out there' as parr of the external world, but require 
people to attribute them. Deanue statuses are therefore social statuses. There are two 
types of dean tie attitudes that can be adopted with respect to our dean tie statuses, 
namely attribution and acknowledgement. \Ve at tribute commitments to others and 
acknowledge the commitments we ourseh-es have. 
If one is licensed to do or to assert something, one is licensed to do so by someone or 
something. This license is constituted 'by attributing ... authority' and 'treating the 
authorised one as fIIlilledto a performance' (Brandom, 161, m,' emphasis). Someone who 
undertakes a commitment does something that 'makes it appropriate to attdbll!e the 
commitment' to her (Brandom, 162), thereby 'entitling those who attribute that 
commitment to sanction nonperformance' (Brandom) 163). For Brandom, it is thus the 
hearer who makes it the case that someone has authority. The speaker is authorised by 
the hearer and her continued participation in the language game depends on the hearer 
(or the community of hearers). 
Through reference to the attitudes of others (i.e. in the community of hearers), we can 
understand the attitude of the speaker whose deontic status is in question (Brandom, 
162). If a hearer attributes a commitment to a speaker, the speaker herself must 
acknowledge or undertake that commitment. This can , howe"er, only be done if a hearer 
has already attributed the commitment to the speaker. Thus attributing is the more 
fundamental of th e [WO types of deonne atti tude. In acknowledging her commitment, the 
speaker entirles the hearer to a particular performance and licenses hex to sanction n011-
c.l Brantlom choo:\t:l' nor to U:\t: thest' (tnns becau:\t' tht:y can bt rt'ad f() imply a 'hit:rarchy of aurhoriry' 
(Brandom, 160), in tht: :\tt1St: of who ha:\ a ri~hr iud~t: :\omt:one t\:\ obliged or pcrmirtt:u to uo somt:rhing, 
upon which he fedl' his account uot::\ nor depend. 
61 
performance. Such sanctioning would be inappropriate unless it had been licensed 
through the acknowledgement of a commitment (Brand om, 163). 
To clarify: if I make the assertion 'It is raining', 1 thereby commit myself to the 
proposition that it is raining. In making this commitment, I entitle the hearer to ask me 
for my reasons for holding the proposition. This is because the hearer attributes the 
commitment to the proposition to lTIe and I ackt10\vledge my commitmen t to it. In cases 
where the speaker fails to acknowledge her commitment, there are twO possible 
scenarios. Either the speaker does not in fact hold a commitmen t to the proposition and 
the hearer is mistaken, or the speaker is decei\~ing herself about her non-coo1mitment to 
the proposition. So, for example, you may misunderstand my assertion about cricker 
being played in my garden and mistakenly attribute ro me a commitment to there being a 
cricket (as in the insect) in m\' garden. In a case such as this, I can prO\'ide you with 
e\-idence to show that your attribution was mistaken, and refuse to acknowledge such a 
commitment. In the other scenario, my in terlocutor may tnake an asserrion that 
'Homosexuality is immoral'. From this I attribute to her a commitment to homophobia. 
She may, mistakenly, refuse to acknowledge trus commitment. However, in this case, the 
e\·idence weighs against her and her refu sal to acknowledge your commitment is due to 
self-deception. It is in cases such as these that rhe practice of imposing sanctions gets a 
foothold. 
SuJItiiOJJJ 
The attribution of a commitment or an enriclement to someone can be understOod in 
terms of the 'practical deontic altitude of taking or treating S01neone as committed or 
entitled 1 (Brand om, 166), which in turn involves a 'disposirion to impose SOlUtion.!" 
(Brandom, 166). Those who attribute deontic staruses may punish 'those who act in 
ways they are not (taken to be) entitled to act, and those who do not act in ways they are 
(raken to be) committed to act' (Brand om, 166). T here are two ""pes of sanctions thar 
can be imposed by those with authority. Brandom terms these 'nonnormative' and 
'normatiye' sanctions (Brandom, 166). Nonnormati''i:e sanctions involve the negative 
reinforcement of the punished behayiour, by such means as the infliction of physical 
pain or by threats of violence. Normative sanctions inyoh'e the alteration of the deontic 
staruses and attirudes of rhe players in rhe language game. Of the "vo t~"pes of sanctions, 
normatiYe sanctions arc the morc serious, since these can inyolvc the exclusion of a 
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player from the language game by the withdrawal by the hearer of her authority to haY< 
commitments or entitlements. If the speaker is a consistent non-performer, the 
withdrawal of her authority to h~ye commitments and entitlements may be more far-
reaching, possibly coming to encompass her interactions with her community at large. 
The example of 'crying wolf can be used to illustrate the operation of these mechanisms 
(Brandom, 180). \\.11en the boy cries wolf, he is committed to the claim that there is a 
wolf in the ,"kinirY. His community is entitled to ask him CO demon strate that he is 
entitled to a commitment to this claim. \V'hen he faih; to demonstrate his entitlement (as 
he must do, since he is not en tirled to the claim that there is a wolf in the vicinity, as 
there is no wolf) his community may punish him by making sure that his father gi,'es him 
a hiding and telling him not to lie about the presence of non-existent wolves. These are 
nonnormative sanctions. If the boy cries wolf on a number of occasions without there 
being a wolf, his community may institute normative sanctions. In trus instance, they will 
withdraw his authority to make claims about wolves - he will no longer be entitled to 
have a commitment to the claim chat there is a wolf. His cOInmunity will no longer 
believe claims he makes about the presence of wolves. He is thus effectively excluded 
from their linguistic community. 
In my earlier illustration of the self-deceived homophobe above, it is normative sanctions 
that ought to help her to mo'·e beyond her self, deception. Normatiye sanctions operate 
b,' questioning (and in extreme cases, such as the crying wolf example above, by 
withdrawing) the speaker's authority to make an assertion about a particular subject. By 
making it clear to her that she is in fact committed to homophobia, through an anah-sis 
of her use of words in her assertion and the implications that they have, i.e. what further 
assertions we may justly infer from them, we aim to make it clear to her that she is self-
deceived about her cornm.itments. If she comes to appreciate Ollr reasoning. then she 
has gained a justified truth-tracking understanding that amounts to self-knowledge . 
.1nalJrsis ojBrolJdom's ot"::ollJ11 oj assntioJl 
Brandom's account of assertion has been analysed as follows: 
By making a claim, a speaker asserts that p if and onh- if (1) she makes a 
corrunitment to demonstrate that she has an entitlement to the commitment that 
p if the hearer asks her to do so, and to do so b,' giving reasons for her belief that 
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p, and (2) she enti tles the hearer to (2.1) ask the speaker to demonstrate that she 
is entitled to the commitment that p and (2.2) penalise the speaker for any failure 
to do so by (.2.2.1 ) nonnormative sanctions or (2.1.2) normative sanctions. (j~ 
This analysis proyides us with the basic form of Brandom's account of assertion. 
\\·b at we ha,Tc thus far is an account of assertion. ~-\s I claimed at the beginning of this 
section, what is needed for the generation o f mutual and truth-tracking understanding is 
the generation of meaning. In the sense in which 'meaning' is m eant here, it m eans the 
understanding that is generated by our mutual use o f words as a linguistic community. I 
will now modify Brandom's account of assertion to pro,~ide my version of an accoun t of 
meaning that retains the inferen tial proprieties that arc central to Brandom's account of 
asserOon. 
Of the ways in which this can be done, it seems that there are two broad approaches. 
One can ejther focu s on the force of the utterance or on its content. In Brandom's 
accoun t of the language game, content plays a prominen t role in the defInition o f deanne 
score. In order to convert Brandom's account o f assertion into an account of meaning, 1 
will thus focus on the content aspect or semantics. 
COlltenl 
According to Brandom, the wa)"s in which the conyersational score changes during the 
various stages of an interchange 'systematically depends on [he semantic content' 
(Brandom, 186) of the asser tions involved. This content allows the specification of the 
'pragmatic significance' (Brandom, 186) of the speech act. '" The designation of 'what 
one associates \vith expressions' (Brandom, 188) as ({contents" is 'at best issuing a 
promissory note that hints at ho\v what are put forward as her semantic correlates ought 
ro be taken to be relevan t [Q determining how those expressions are correctly used ' 
(Brandom, 188). The specification of the content o f an utterance is, wi thin Brandom's 
(,: I ()we this anal~'sis of Brandom's account of asst:rtion ro Da\'ltl Ryan. Th~ analysis aprears in his papers. 
'Grict='s account of meaning - Brandom's account of assertion: To what extent can rht: accounts be 
inttgratt:d' (presented at Rhodes uni\'ersity on 8 Sep[emb~r 2000) and in 'Theories of :-'leaning - an 
:\ccount of th~ir D~vd()pm~nt' (presented at Rhodes Uni\'ersiry on 31 :-'lay 2001). 
(')Brandnm draws on D ummetr's notion that thert: ma~' b~ a 'uniform pattern o f deri\'acion of the usc [of a 
sp~t:ch act1 from tht: conr~nt [thcn:ofj' (Brandom, 187). \"hils!' he ackno\Vl~dges thar there may in fact not 
be any such uniform pattern to b~ found, Brandom's later remarks seem to imply that he is appealing ro 
jus t such a !"locion. 
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theory, inextricably bound up with the IVle pla"ed by the content of that utterance, in 
relation to the content of o ther utterances, within the language game. 
Consider a situation in which two people ~ "'1 and B) are participating in a linguistic 
interchange. .1 is the hearer (whom Brandom designates the scorekeeper) and B is the 
speaker or asserter. The wa~' in which / l's score 'ought to be transformed' during the 
course of th e interchange is 'settled by the content of B's claim' (Brandom, 190, emphasis 
mine). Thus when B asserts a proposition, p. _1 must cyaluate B's entitlement to a 
commitment that p. as well as any propositions that are entailed by or incompatible with 
p. If . ·1 has previously attributed to B a commitment to proposition g, and p and g are 
incompatible, then .1 has to make an adjustment to the commitments and entitlements 
which she has atrributed to B. Thus the deontic score undergoes a transformation. 
lvleanillg 
Brandom makes a number of references to meaning and what it is tbat determines the 
meaning of a proposition in the course of his account of assertion. These comments are 
useful in the conversion of this account to an account of meaning. 
Brandom states that it is the institution of social proprieties b,' the plavers of the 
language game that is 'the ultimate source of meanings' (Brandom, 159). Meaning is thus 
created in the process of playing the game. He further elaborates this point by appealing 
more specificall y to what he terms 'practical inferential proprieties' (Brandom, 174). 
\,'hen a speaker makes an assertion that p, she is doing two thjngs. Firsdy, she is 
authorising future assertions and the commitments that these enta.il (both for the speaker 
and fo r the audience). Secondh' she is 'lIndertaking a specific task mponsibilitj (Brandom, 
173) to show that she is en tided to her claim and to do so by, for example, 'issuing other 
assertions to jilstify the original claim' (Brand om, 173). The conten t of the COmmltment 
expressed by the cla.im that p - 'that the authority it claims and the justificatory 
responsibility it undertakes are specifically "to the effect that p" - consists in its 
specific inferential articulation' (Brandom, 173). This 'specific inferential articulation' 
invokes the two things that a speaker does that are mentioned above. 
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In order to fulfil her justificatory responsibility, a speaker has to gi\'e reasons for her 
entitlement to the conuniunent to the daim that p. In order to do this, she must assert 
premises from which the claim that p follows as a conclusion. If the hearer takes these 
premises to be correct then she 'implicitly endorsers] a certain inference' (Brandom, 174). 
In doing so the 'practical attitude' of the hearer to take the inference as correct 
'instituters] inferential proprieties' (Brandom, 174). It is the institution of these 
inferential proprieties that (make noises and marks mean \vhat they mean' (Brandom, 
174). 
,\ brief illustrati\'e example should suffice to clarify this. You and I are having a 
conversation. I make the assertion 'I am a generous person'. You ask me to justify this 
statement. I am unable to do so. There is no evidence that J can produce from which 
the conclusion that I am a generous person would foll ow. On the other hand, you can 
produce eyidence to the contrary - I tend not to help others in need, refuse to tip 
waiters, will not go out of my way to assist people, even if it does not require much effort 
on my part. It thus becomes clear that I cannot fulfil my justificatory responsibility and 
that my assertion is based on a self-deceived (or, at least, incorrect) belief that I hold 
about myself. We are thus able to see that there is a problem. Through this dialogic 
exchange, r should, unless I experience a failure of rationality, come to a new piece of 
truth-tracking self· knowledge: r am not a generous person; in fact, I am rather selfish . 
Viewing the process of meaning-generation in this way pro\'ides us with a way in which 
the participants in a dialogue can come to an understanding that is both mutual and 
truth-tracking. Given that both participants operate according to the same rules of 
dialogic engagement, their understanding will be mutual. The understanding becomes 
truth-tracking due to the fact that making assertions and thus generating meaning 
requires that the speaker be able to offer sufficient proof in favour of those assertions. If 
an assertion is made for which there is no warrant, the hearer will disbelieve it, and is 
entitled to institute sanctions to discourage the speaker from making unwarranted 
assertions in the furure. As I ha\"e illustrated aboye, this also puts us in a position to 
generate new and accurate self-knowledge, through the process of being called to 
account for assertions that we make about ourseh:es. 
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This account provides us with a theoretical basis from which we can now examine the 
relationship between the speaker and the hearer, so as to determine how they may 
interact in such a way that they respect each other in the dialogic encounter. 
3. Ineradicable difference 
Jopling states that the type of dialogue that will lead to self-knowledge must involve 
respect for the difference between self and other. However, apart from a brief reference 
to Le\"inas, he does not explain this requirement very much. In fact, such respect is 
essential to the acquisition of self-knowledge through dialogue, as I will demonstrate in 
this section. 
In this section I examine what Jopling has to say about respect in the context of dialogue. 
1 use his brief reference to Leyinas' Tota/il)' and h(filli()1 as a departure point, since Levinas' 
work is undoubtedly useful \vith reference to respecting th e otherness of the other. I 
expand upon this by drawing on Levinas' critique of Merleau-Ponty's account of 
intersubjecrivity in 'On Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty', as it is in this paper 
that the necessity of respecting difference in order to gain new self-knowledge is made 
clear. 
In the account of meaning-generation above, I discussed the process of dialogue in terms 
of the making of assertions and the providing of warrant for these assertions. .-\nother 
way of viewing this process is to look at it as a process of 'addressing and responding' 
Gopling, 152) occurring between interlocutors. In this view, we may term the 
interlocutors self and other. Here dialogue is an interaction between self and other that 
takes place through mutual address and response. 
This \·iew of dialogue is grounded in the insight that 'to be a person is to stand in a 
unique set of relations to other persons' Gopling, 152). \\'hat constitutes the uniqueness 
of these relations is the 'asymmetry' that they haye 'with respect to all other forms of 
relations, particularly relations to things and events' G opling, 152-153). According to 
Jopling, when we interact with things or events, we take certain objective properties to be 
true of them and subsequently respond in ways that are appropriate, gi\~en these 
objectiye qualities. \\"hen we interact with persons, on the other hand, it is not because 
67 
we discern in them objective features like rationality that we treat them appropriately. 
Rather, 'our treating a creature and responding to it in certain ways is somehow fO llxtitlltive 
of its being a person ' Gopling, 153). Part of this special wa )" of interacting is 'master)" of 
the unique form of language of personal reference associated with the first-person and 
second-person pronouns' Gopling, 153). 
The importance of the masten' of this aspect of language is as follows. When I am 
in" olved in a dialogue with another person, I refer to myself as 'I' (the fir st-person 
nominatiye pronoun) and to the other person as 'you' (the second-person nominative 
pronoun). It is never possible for me to make the other '1', she always remains 'you'. 
This immediately draws our attention to the fact that it is the other's difference from me 
that makes my interaction with her signifi cant. Dialogue taking place between sel f and 
other is not 'a union, an empathetic identifi cation, or a blending of the self \\; th the other 
in some harmonious synthetic whole: it is a relation between two separated terms, the 
self [I) and the other [you), Gopling, 153) . 
Since] opling's basis for his respect claim is rather thin , I shall provide a detailed account 
of how and why respect is important in dialogue. Jopling appeals briefly to Levinas' 
statement in Totality alld Illfillity that '[dJiscourse is the experience of something absoluteh· 
foreign, a pure experience, a traumatism of astonishment' (quoted in Jopling, 153). J 
shall now demonstrate Levinas' reasons for believing this to be so, via a discussion of 
what he takes to be the flaws in Merleau-Ponty's theory of intersubjectivity. This version 
of Levinas' account is important, as it brings to the fore why it is that respect for dijfenmce 
is important in the gaining of self-knowledge. 
In 'On Intersubjectivity: Notes on ~\'1erleau-Ponty', Le,"inas provides an account in which 
intersubjectivity or sociali ty 'does not absorb the difference of strangeness' (Leyinas, 
103). In order to give this account, Levinas discusses and criticises ~1erleau-Ponty's 
account of intersubjectivlry, which he believes relies too heavily on the notion of 
sameness, whilst underemphasising that of difference"'. 
Uerleau-Pon~: 's account of intersubjecti,<ity begins b,· focusing on the body. Our 
perception of the objectiye nature of things necessarily involns 'a movement of the 
(,~ :'ly thanks to Dr Rosalyn Diprose for her comments on an earlier yersion of this section. 
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as flesh incarnating thought' (Le\-inas, 96-97). By this Merleau-Pon,,· is 
referring to what he c!sewhere(,5 termed the 'body-subject' - subjectivity incarnate. Thus, 
even our perceptions of our own bodies as objective entities (as they are given to medical 
or biological examination) must be constiruted from the powers of the body-subject 
(Leyinas, 97). Hence, in order to constitute the o bjectiye body, consciousness ha~ to call 
on the bod\· (as body-subject) which it is supposed to be constituting as body-object. 
This appears to be problematic. However, for lvlerleau-Ponty, the incarnation of thought 
(as, in Husserlian terms 'apperception' (Lcvinas, 97), or in Merleau-Ponty's tenns, body-
subject) is prior to any theoretical or practical position that the subject may assume - it is 
the primary synthesis (as opposed to beginning with thought and from there attempting 
to synthesise the body and subjectivity) (Leyinas, 97). This original incarnation of 
thought is meaningfully revealed by the movements of the body, which are essentially 
sIgnifying, by virtue of being expressive and gestural, and embedded within a specific 
cultural context. 
~ \5 yet, it may be unclear what this process has to do with intersubjectiyity. However, 
Merleau-Pon,,- holds that in order to move from our subjective perception of the 
sensible qualities of the world (the world as we experience it) to the objective"" qualities 
of the world (the world as it is in reality, including certain aspects of ourselves) we need 
intersubjective agreement about that sensible content (Leyinas, 99). The incarnation o f 
thought about objects described above presupposes intersubjectivity. Thus, according to 
Levinas, the problem with 1ferleau-Ponty's account is that the incarnation of thought 
presupposes intersubjectivity and the account of inrcrsubjectiviry presupposes 
intersubjectiye agreement. _-\5 we will see below, it is precisely this requirement for 
agreement that mitigates against respect for difference and thus against the acquisition of 
new knowledge. 
Levinas claims that, for Nlerleau-Ponty, our relations with others are dependent on the 
'carnal strucrure of sensibility' (Levinas, 100). Thus, intersubjecti,-ity is dependent on 
embodiment. The prototypical case of this is Merleau-Pont:y's example of the 'double 
touching of one hand touching the other and that, during this touching is touched by the 
other hand' (Le\-inas, 99). Merleau-Ponty begins with "vo hands belonging to the same 
(, .~ For examph:. in PhwoJJJtll%gr qf Perup.'ioll. 
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person and then extrapolates from these to two hands belonging to different people. 
According to Levinas, this is not an argument from analogy, as self and other are here 
both elements of the same Cintercorporeity' (Levinas, 100) - the co-presence of one 
person's hands (because the\' belong to the same body) is extended to the situation 
involving the other (although she has a different body). 
Thus, intersubjectivity is not something that I perceive through my interactions with 
others, but is reconstructed by analogy from the personal case. ,As I\1erleau-Ponty puts 
it: (1 borrow myself from the other; 1 make him out of my own thoughts: that is not a 
failure in the perception of others, it is the perception of others' (quoted in Levinas, 100, 
my emphasis). Leyinas questions whether this construal of intersubject1\rity ever moves 
beyond "knowledge". By trus he means what you already know (or think you know). 
This sort of "knowledge" may be problematic. :\s we have already seen, we may, despite 
our best intentions, experience failures of self-knowledge, such as self-deception. Thus, 
by failing to move beyond "knowledge" in this sense, we do not arrive at ne\-v self-
knowledge. \X,nilst lvferleau-Ponty's focus is on the pretheoretical, this very fact already 
ties his account to the theoretical (.i, and, according to Levinas, renders jt subordinate to 
it, as a 'shadow of that to which it is related' (Levinas, 100). Thus our encountering of 
the other in intersub jectivity is, for Merleau-Ponty, 'already or still - knowledge' (Levinas, 
101). "-\n account of intersubjectivity that relies on the self's knowledge of the other 
'does not break the order of consciousness' (Levina::., 1(1 ). In other words, it does not in 
fact allow the self to relate to the other in ways that acknowledge the difference between 
them. This is because knowledge, 'cleaving to the kl10wn .. . immediately coincides with 
what might have been foreign to it' (Levinas, 101). Because knowledge is premised on 
the known, the familiar, the self coincides with the other - all values given to the other 
are based on the self's prior knowledge (of itself). Thus what we have is a situation that 
is the reverse of what ]oplrng argues for. Instead of dialogue with the other acting as a 
source of self-knowledge, dialogue with the other serves merely to reinforce the self's 
prior conception of itself, through a projection thereof onto the other. 
(,(, The use of the word 'objective' here is not it metaphysical one. B~' the objecti\'e yualities of the world, 
:\Ierkau-Ponty ffieam those aspects to which we all (at least potentially) have access, not those qualities 
that are exist beyond and without any subjectivity. 
,,- \\oat Leyinas means hert: is that the pretheorerical already has tht: rhemetical as its reference point. By 
drawing- the contras t between 'theoretical' and 'pretheoreacal' one is already tying oneself to the theoretical, 
SlOce it remains the primary rdefence poinr. 
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Thus, for Leyinas (as it would be for Jopling if he were to use this paper of Levinas'), the 
problem with i\1erleau-Ponry's account of intersubjectivity is that it assumes 
intersubjecti\'ity as springing from the self's knowledge of the other (which is in fact 
subsumed by the self's knowledge of itself), which subsumes the other's difference and 
renders them into san1cness. In opposition to rhis, Levinas clailns that what is essential 
to intersubjectivity is that which is 'beyond knowledge' (Levinas, 101). 
The two hands im'oh'ed in Merleau·Pont\·'s prototypical case 'in point of fact do not 
belong to the same body, nor to a hypothetical or metaphorical intercorporeity' (Levinas, 
102). According to Levinas, this is signified in 'the nakedness of the face' (Levinas, 102) 
of the other and in the expressivit), of het body, as embodied in her gestures. 'Beginning 
with the face - in which the other is approached according to his or her illeradicable 
difference in ethical responsibilit\· - sociality, as the human possibility of approaching the 
other, the absolutely other, is signified, that is, commanded' (Levinas, 102, my emphasis). 
Levinas goes on to state that ' [pJerhaps the spiritual only shows ... when being's routine 
is interrupted: in the strangeness of humans vis-a.-vis one another, but [is the strangenessJ 
of humans capable of a sociality in which the bond is I/O IOllger tbe illtegratioll of pO/ts ill " 
wbole (Levinas, 102·103, my emphasis). The notion of sociality as the integration of parts 
in a whole would clearly be effected by the sort of metapborical intercorporeit\, to which 
Levinas believes ~[erJeau-Ponty appeals. According to Levinas, intersubjectivity is 
effected, not through appeals to sameness or commonality between the self and the 
other, but through their 'ineradicable difference' (Levinas, 102). 
It is this notion of the inerarucable difference between self and other that allows 
addressi,'e exchanges bet\veen self and other to lead to the acquisition of self· knowledge. 
It is only now, having examined Levinas' account of intersubjectivity contra Merleau-
Pont)' that the reasons for this are clear. The other's alterity call s into question my self, 
and my conventional or comfortable self.understandings (Jopling, 162). In the face of 
such difference, I am called to account for myself to the other. This parallels the notion 
of justificatory responsibility that grounded my account of meaning as a modification of 
Brandom's account of assertion. However, not only am I called to justify myself, my 
beliefs and assernons to the other, I must also respect her. It is true that both mutual 
and truth-tracking understanding can occur \vithout respect for difference. However, 
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without respect, such understanding is not sufficient for the gaining of self-knowledge. 
It is my respons i\~eness to the other's difference that renders my interaction \vith her one 
in which she and I respect each other. If I am responsive to the other's difference, and 
to her addressing me, then I do not try to subsume her and render her the same as me. 
Thus I treat her with respect. \\'ithout respect for (he other's difference, we will not 
arrive at the type of self-kn owledge that can only be gained through dialogic relations 
with others. It is for this reason that respect for di fference plays such an important role 
in self-knowledge as a dialogic process. 
4. E ternal return revisited 
\'V"c are now able to return to our examination of eternal rerurn. As I argued in section 4 
of Chapter 2, what is required when living authentically in accordance with the ideal of 
eternal return is a rigorous attempt at self-knowledge. \\"e now have an account of self-
knowledge that directs us out of our 'loneliest loneliness' and into dialogue with others. 
As I have argued above, without dialogue, we cannot arri\-e at a complctc(ofl self-
understanding. Thus, if self- knowledge is an essential component o f authenticity, then 
dialogue itself is necessary for the successful pursuit of the ideal of eternal return. In 
turn, [espect for difference is an essential parr of the requisite type of dialogue. Thus, to 
be a successfully authentic agent, I must engage in dialogue with others that preSetTeS 
respect for their difference. This renders the 'heaviest weight' one that we do not, in 
f::l.ct, have to bear alone, nor can we in fact bear alone, if we are to be successful in our 
endea,"ours to be authentic. \\'hilst each of us is responsible for ourselves, through our 
responsiyeness to others, we are placed in a position where our resources for dealing 
with that responsibility in a manner that is not self-deceiyed are greatly increased. 
/011 Ir is doubtful thar such a thing as 'complett:' sdf-knowledge is e'"er achienble. Howevt:r, WI;: may vit:,,, 
the notion of complt:tt: sdf-knowkdge as a regulative ideal- something for which we ought to aim, even if 
it can neYer be fully realised. 
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Postscript 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I began by drawing a distinction between ethics and 
morality. I argued that too narrow a focus on only the moral leads to gaps in our 
normati,'e theories and thence proposed that we ought to look to an ethical ideal, that of 
authenticity, to fill these gaps. In the second chapter I laid out Nietzsche's account of 
authenticity as eternal return. 1 argued that a fundamental fea ture of eternal return (and 
of authenticity in general) is a rigorous search for self-knowledge. In the third chapter I 
augmented Nietzsche's theory of authenticity with an account of self-knowledge that 
would be strong enough to support the rigorous self-knowledge acquisition required bv 
Nietzsche', ideal. This account figured the project of acquiring self-knowledge as, at 
times, requiring a dialogic process that respected the difference bet\,'een self and other. 
There are, ho\Ve\~er, two questions that arise from the argument in this thesis that I have 
not answered in it. 
The first of these is the question of th e relation bet\veen ethics and morality. Does 
advocating a renewed focus on the ethical render the moral obsolete' If we are to take 
ethical ideals as being important in guiding our lives and how we live them, does this 
mean that we \vill take the prescriptions of normative moral theory less seriously? 
The above questions open up a new direction in which to take this research, one that is 
of too great a scope to receive any detailed treatment in a thesis of this length . :\t this 
stage, howe,'er, I shall make some preliminary comments on what I belie"e to be the 
answers to them. 
It seems clear to me that focusing on the ethical does not render the moral obsolete. 
The moral is, after all, as I argued in section 1 of Chapter 1, a subset of the ethical. The 
two are not mutually exclusive pursuits. On the contrary in fact, a focus on the ethical 
ought, if it is correctly pursued, to haye beneficial effects on our pursuit of the moral. 
This is because, if we ground our practices in a suitable ethical ideal, our adherence to 
moral norms gains impetus from the inside, as it were. In other words, given adherence 
to an ethical ideal such as authenticity, our adoption of moral norms is motivated by 
internal reasons, not by external imposition. The question of motivation with respect to 
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the adoption of moral norms is a large and complicated one and one that would require 
exrensi,-e treatment of its own . 
.\S I commented in section 1 of Chapter 1, moral norms tend to deal largely with other-
regarding actions. The importance of the moral as a subset o f the ethical remains, 
particularly with respect to this aspect of our actions. \\ 'hilst ethical ideals give us 
importan t and much-needed guidance with respect to how we ought [0 live, and the 
account of self-knowledge that I have prm'ided argues that respect for the rlifference of 
th e other is essential to self-knowledge acquisition and thus to the successful pursuit of 
authenticity, there are other aspects of our in teraction~ with others about which we may 
need directi,"es. Thus, we may argue that, even if we shift the focu s from being solely on 
the realm of the moral, we ought still to take the injunctions of normative theory 
seriously. 
If we view morality in Nozickian fashion as side-consm.ints, with ethics offering 
guidance about ",vhat goes on within the boundari es set by these constraints, then there 
seems to be no prana facie reason for '"iewing a stronger focus on th e ethical as a threat 
to the moral. 
The second of these questions is one that I raised an d partially dealt with in section 1 of 
Chapter 2. This is the question of what Nietzsche's attitude to the moral actually is. In 
Chapter 2 I argued that Nietzsche's primary focus, especially in 011 Ih , G,,,,alog)' of Morals, 
is in fact the ethicaL However, it is clear that he did hayc criticisms of normative moral 
theories, such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. T he question of his attitude to the moral 
is a complex one, too large to deal with adequately in a project of this size, but which 
would (and has) provided the basis for new scholarship on how we ought to interpret 
N ietzsche. 
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